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ABSTRACT 
          This study develops an analytical framework for investigating Government of 
Uganda‘s support for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) development paradigm. It 
compares macroeconomic and institutional incentives in attracting FDI and institutional 
weaknesses. This study also discusses the nature of FDI, benefits of FDI in terms of its 
spillovers, and strategic issues and policies for managing stakeholders in the economy.  
 
          While Ugandan government maintains the view that improving on policy 
environment will attract FDI to address the country’s development challenges, this study 
found out that, progress in policy environment (fiscal incentives, political stability, and 
good regulation) does not automatically lead to changes in the host’s degree of attracting 
FDI unless it is aided by economic fundamentals like the availability of natural resources, 
market size and growth. Uganda has stagnated for the last 9 years with no improvement 
in terms of attracting more FDI. As shown in the finding, fiscal incentives influence FDI 
locational decisions in Uganda, but are not the most important factors however remain 
necessary evils to remedy poor microeconomic variables. 
 
          In spite of government’s success on achieving macro reforms to attract FDI, 
institutional weaknesses undermine its efforts. Foreign investors pay bribes to access 
public sector provided utilities. FDI relatively concentrates in one region which is 
inconsistent with a balanced development thesis. A move towards defining property 
rights causes unpopularity of FDI. Government always relies on a crisis strategy rather 
than a deliberate strategy to manage the different groups of stakeholders and other 
constraints in the economy.  
 
          This study’s conclusion is that FDI alone is not a necessary condition for economic 
development unless it is complemented by host policies to increase the absorptive 
capacity of its spillovers.  
 
 
 
 X 
PREFACE 
This study investigates government position on the importance of using FDI to address 
the country’s development challenges. It is an exploratory and analytical study in which 
data and concepts were developed to explain the emerging issues and best-practiced 
policies. Analysis of documents and follow-up of business news on FDI constituted the 
qualitative methodology, though quantitative for macro and micro levels. Relevant data 
was collected from both internal and external sources. Internal sources were from Uganda 
Investment Authority, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development; 
Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry; Privatization Unit, Private Sector Foundation 
Uganda; and Bank of Uganda. External sources were from United Nations Conferences 
for Trade and Development, World Bank and United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization. All these organizations have great interests in FDI as an alternative 
development paradigm in developing host economies. Because the quality of the 
information varies across reports, this study utilizes data at disaggregate levels.    
 
This Thesis is organized into seven chapters. Chapter one includes the Methodological 
Background that defines the problem statement, research question and investigative 
questions and study scope. Chapter two covers Theoretical and Literature Review on FDI 
and Development in Host Economies including theories explaining FDI, Macroeconomic 
and institutional incentives, basic characteristics of FDI enterprises, benefits from FDI 
spillovers, and policy options for managing FDI desirability in host economies.   
 
 XI 
Chapter three covers discussions on FDI in Uganda’s economy. The theoretical 
underpinnings and research findings are discussed concurrently. It evaluates the 
importance of macroeconomic and institutional incentives in attracting FDI in Uganda. 
Macroeconomic reforms discussed include fiscal incentives, monetary and trade policies 
and political stability. While other factors discussed include the return of Asian investors, 
privatization programs, the creation of an Investment Promotion Agency, the medium 
term competitive strategy, the big push strategy and regional initiatives. Last in this 
chapter, are comparisons of constrains between foreign and domestic manufacturing 
firms in Uganda.   
 
 Chapter four covers basic characteristics of FDI enterprises in Uganda’s economy with a 
special emphasis on sectoral orientation, country of origin, entry mode choices, and 
regional distribution of TNCs. Emphasis is focused on relating the characteristics to the 
need of the economy to overcome its development challenges. 
 
Chapter five is based on FDI spillovers. These are export development and market 
access, linkages, technological spillovers, human capital development, enterprise 
development and restructuring, and inducing competition. Chapter six discusses urgent 
policy measures that Uganda has to address if they are to minimize the cost of doing 
business by TNCs and retain capital already attracted into the economy. Chapter seven 
gives recommendations and conclusion.  
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Definition of Concepts:  
1. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): FDI is a foreign corporation or company having 
essential attributes of a corporation that is chartered under the laws of a state or 
government other than that in which it is doing the business (Webster’s Third New 
International dictionary, p.889). FDI involves control of a resident entity in one 
economy by an enterprise resident in another economy (UNCTAD, 1996, p.20). It is 
entry through mergers and acquisitions (UNCTAD, 2000, p.101). The World Bank 
defines it as an investment made to acquire lasting management (usually at least 10 
% of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in a country other than that of the host 
investors (Gillis et al, 2001, p.522). 
 
2. Transnational Corporations (TNCs): TNCs are enterprises that produce in more than 
one country and consider overseas’ operations to be central to its profitability (Gillis 
et al, 2001, p.524) while Moosa (2002, p.2) defines TNCS as firms that do cross 
border activities via subsidiaries, affiliates and join ventures.  
3. Distinguishing between FDI and TNCs  
Transnational corporations (TNCs) are parent enterprises or foreign affiliates, usually 
have some degree of equity stake; usually 10 percent needed for effective voice in 
management, While FDI refers to capital flows between parent and subsidiary 
enterprises.
1
 The operational definition considers TNCs and FDI to mean the same.
 
 _________________________ 
1http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3148&lang=1 
 
 2 
Operational Definitions: 
1.  Foreign direct Investment (FDI): This study refers to FDI and TNCs to mean the 
same in Uganda’s economy, whether Joint Ventures, Mergers and Acquisitions or 
Greenfield, in which foreign investors have greatest share usually 10 percent of the 
equity stake and taking full management say and controls.  
2. Development Objectives: Development objectives are specific to the generation of 
employment and improving household incomes, sustaining regional development, and 
technology spillovers, local capabilities in absorbing FDI benefits, building linkages 
for enterprise development, and competition in the private sector led economy. 
3. Host economy: Host economy refers to the country in which the enterprises are 
operating rather than their home economy 
 
Constructs:  
Quality FDI attraction means attracting FDI to meet host’s development objectives, 
especially in areas of resource capabilities, and location advantages.  
Appropriate policy regimes are defined in terms of employing FDI policies which are 
relevant to the country’s level of development and priority activities. These include 
opening up for FDI, active marketing targeting specific subsets of TNCs for industrial 
and export developments. Appropriate FDI incentives mean incentives which have great 
impact in the economy in terms of spillovers, such as in priority industries, regional 
development, exporting research and development. Significant spillovers mean human 
resource development, export promotion, technological transfers, linkages and enterprise 
development and restructuring. Spillovers depend on host’s absorptive capacity, level of 
 3 
economic development, degree of education and extent of competition in the host 
country. Improving host capabilities to increase absorptive capacity occurs as a result of 
spillovers by offering quality education on top of the general education, human resource 
development in managerial skills and increased expenditures on infrastructure. 
 
Technological competence depicts the ability of host’s economy to acquire and use the 
technological knowledge to promote economic development. It should be relevant to the 
host’s stage of development, and injecting competition through avoidance of cartel 
practices. The promotion of business linkages is likely to be successful if all systematic 
policy approaches to all factors influencing linkages are adopted and could lead to 
spillovers. Host country regulations promote domestic development priorities and 
linkages to protect public welfare from the negative impact of FDI. Quality of regulations 
and good governance improve investor’s perceptions. Host country’s capacity to 
influence and control TNCs determines the outcome of FDI.  
 
Based on above concepts and constructs, a simple model is developed to guide a 
developing country in maximizing FDI spillovers. This is based on the following 
assumptions: first, that government is in a position to strategically attract quality FDI, and 
secondly, that government can discretionary apply various policy approaches that suit its 
development objectives. Since FDI enters into the host economy through various forms 
such greenfield (new investment), mergers and acquisitions, and joint ventures, 
government therefore, determines quality FDI to maximize its spillovers. The end result 
 4 
is addressing host development challenges. Hence, economic growth and development 
will be achieved and sustained as illustrated below.    
 
Illustration 1: A simple Model for a developing country 
using FDI as an alternative development paradigm: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s contribution  
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Background to the study: 
It is important to discuss the best-policy practices that work for development objectives 
of host economies. FDI plays a significant role in the development process of host 
economies because it acts as a catalyst for obtaining foreign technology and knowledge, 
managerial skills and capital. However, policies are required to maximize spillovers from 
FDI and minimize the negative externalities fundamentally by determining what role the 
government wants FDI to play in its development process as a host economy. The 
renewed confidence in the positive benefits of FDI has led many countries that were 
restricting FDI in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s to be more open towards FDI in the 1990s.
2
 
More so, there is an increased recognition that the bundle of assets and capabilities 
encompassed in FDI could contribute directly to the growth and development of national 
economies,
3
 declining levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA) have increased 
reliance on FDI, and least but not last, is that developing countries have gained 
confidence in their ability to maximize benefits and minimize liabilities of Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs).
4
 Host government interventions on the activities of FDI enterprises 
may be motivated by two primary types of market failures: 1) coordination failures in 
development process; and 2) divergence of private interests of investors and social 
interests of the host economies (UNCTAD, 2003a, p.41). In spite the effort in improving 
policy environments in sub Saharan Africa (SSA), its share of FDI in developing 
countries is declining and its inflows have been characterized by absolute progress but 
with a relative decline (Asiedu, 2004, p.41). “It is not enough to improve on one’s policy 
environment, but improvements need to be made in both absolute terms and relative 
terms”. This signifies the complementary role of FDI to domestic investment as a means 
to an end and not the end itself.  
 6 
Uganda demonstrated efforts to achieve economic development by instituting Uganda 
Industrial Act of 1963 to promote both private and local investors (Obwona, 2001, p.50; 
Obwona & Egesa, 2004, p.5-9) and Foreign Investment Act of 1964 provided for 
protection of investors against illegal state’s expropriation. However, the “economic war” 
declared by President Amin’s regime in 1972 led to the deterioration of investment 
climate in the economy, that was characterized by nationalization, hostility against 
foreign investors. This is because he wanted to empower local Ugandans in running the 
economy.  
 
To re-build the confidence of foreign investors in the economy, Uganda Investment 
Authority (UIA) was created to link up investors into the economy via effective 
marketing, and also implemented the privatization program in 1992 (UCTAD, 2000a, 
p.3&4; Obwona, 2001, p.52; &MIGA, 2004, p.47) and it is now a model in Africa. This 
made Uganda to be ranked among the “forerunners” of FDI in Africa in 1998 (UNCTAD, 
2000a, p.3&4). Even total flows of FDI went upwards from US$ 1 million in 1991 to 
US$256.4 in 2005.
5
 Uganda’s GDP (average annual growth) reached 5.6 per cent in 
2005. Uganda is now among the newly market oriented economies that employs liberal 
policies for attracting FDI to solve the economy’s development challenges. 
__________________________ 
2 FDI has the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in one economy in an entity 
resident in an economy other than that of the investors, with lasting usually defined as a 10 per cent in the 
entity (Te Velde, 2001, p.4). 
3For a decade, economists became convinced that the key to rapid economic development lay not in a 
country's natural resources, physical or human capital, but rather in the set of economic policies that it 
pursued (Kobrin, 2001, p. 68) 
4
Te Velde (2001, p.29) recognized that local capabilities play a dual role of attracting FDI and absorbing 
positive spillovers associated with FDI. 
5IMF, Balance of payments CD ROM, August 2006 available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_fdistat/docs/wid_cp_ug_en.pdf 
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CHAPTER ONE 
METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND 
1.1 Problem statement: 
Of recent, public debates and criticisms are being directed to the Government of Uganda 
about the significance of achieving economic development by attracting FDI. While 
government maintains that improving policy environment will attract FDI to finance the 
economy without adding further indebtedness, critics justified their arguments based on 
the sense that FDI is being attracted into Uganda due to the availability of incentives 
(UNIDO, 2002, p.13) and have made little progress in creating economic benefits to 
ordinary Ugandans. FDI is oriented into export of traditional products that have limited 
linkages in the economy. Geographical position of Uganda constraints FDI ability to 
expand the economy through trade and take part in global specialization and Uganda has 
to depend on appropriate political and commercial relationships with Kenya and 
Tanzania (UNCTAD, 2003b, p.2&3) in order to access sea ports. Uganda has narrow 
resource base and domestic market even though it is ranked third in terms of progress in 
business environment and number eleven in Africa in terms of FDI attraction (UNCTAD, 
1999, p.48&49). This study therefore, evaluates Government of Uganda’s stand on the 
importance of using FDI to address the country’s development challenges, based on a 
study of the best practiced outcomes related to FDI spillovers and then suggests policy 
options for such maximization. This study covers the period from 1990-2006 as a 
reflection of the beginning of liberalization and privatization. This range is sufficient for 
analyzing the best practiced outcomes related FDI spillovers.  
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1.2    Research question: 
To what extent the Government of Uganda supports FDI as an alternative development 
paradigm? What are possible strategies for maximizing FDI benefits to meet Ugandan 
development objectives?   
 
1.3       Investigative questions:  
1. How do macroeconomic and institutional incentives affect FDI in Uganda? 
2. What are the basic characteristics of FDI enterprises in Uganda? 
3. To what extent has Uganda as a host benefited from FDI spillovers? 
4. What are some strategic policies that Uganda has to consider urgently for effective 
targeting of FDI? 
 
1.5   Study Scope:   
This study covers FDI in Uganda with regards to macroeconomic and institutional 
incentives, basic characteristics of investing enterprises, FDI benefits through spillovers 
rather than direct effects in countries of low domestic savings and weak financial 
intermediation, and looks at the policy options for managing FDI desirability. This study 
covers the period from 1990 to 2006 as a reflection of the beginning of liberalization and 
privatization policies in Uganda. It is from this time that Uganda started opening up its 
economy for private investors and Uganda Investment Authority was created in 1991 to 
facilitate investment marketing. This period is considered sufficient to realize results of 
FDI policies pursued.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN HOST 
ECONOMIES:  
THEORETICAL AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1   Introduction: 
This chapter covers the literature review on FDI in host economies. The various aspects 
of FDI discussed include: FDI theories, macroeconomic and institutional incentives, basic 
characteristics of FDI enterprises, FDI benefits, and policy options for managing FDI in 
host economies.  The eclectic theory (OLI) developed by Dunning (1981, 1988, 1995,) 
provides a conceptual framework for explaining FDI in Host Economies.  The paradigm 
states that FDI is a function of three variables: (1) existence of Ownership-Specific 
Advantages (O) that is based on firm’s resources and capabilities; (2) host country’s 
Location-Specific Advantages (L) comprised of both natural and created resources; and 
(3) is the Internalization (I) by which firms combine Ownership Advantages with 
Location Advantages to improve their competitiveness. Scholars see the theory as 
significance in explaining reasons for ‘why’, ‘how’, and ‘where’ of TNCs production, 
whereas others see the explanatory importance of constituting many variables as a source 
limitation. Kehal (2004, p.16) found that market size is the most popular factor 
influencing a country propensity to attract inward investment, and this was supported by 
subsequent empirical literature he reviewed to justify the market size hypothesis. In line 
with the above mentioned factors which attract FDI, availability of natural resources in 
host economies is the most fundamental factor. Others can include market size and 
growth rate, political factors and economic stabilization for poorly resourced economies. 
In fact, these factors depend on the nature of host economies.  
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2.2 Macroeconomic and Institutional Reforms in Host 
Economies: 
This subsection discusses liberalization and privatization programs in host economies 
implemented to attract FDI, determinants and motivations of FDI, fiscal incentives, 
Investment Promotion Agencies and Export Promotion Zones, performance requirements, 
decentralization of FDI process. 
 
2.2.1: Liberalization and privatization: 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) declined by the beginning of 1990s (UNCTAD, 
1998, p.13) and host economies resorted to different policies of attracting FDI. However, 
a low-waged country, even with liberal policies, needed various advantages such as 
natural resources and political stability for attracting FDI (Wood, 2001, p.18). African 
governments have put efforts in economic liberalization (UNCTAD, 1995, p.95), 
addressing investors concerns, privatizing and  actively promoting investment 
(UNCTAD, 2003, p.36), making a total of 42 regulatory changes to favor FDI by 2005 
(UNCTAD, 2006, p.46). But more are yet needed on improving political stability and 
privatization through political consensus of transparent policy (UNCTAD, 1995, p.90). 
However, political consensus is a nightmare in developing countries where power 
distribution is explained well by using elitist theory.  
 
Privatization programs are common in African countries like Angola, Cape Verde, and 
among others (UNCTAD, 1998, p. 170). Privatization programs across Africa and 
African Growth and Opportunities Act have influenced strategic investors (UNCTAD, 
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2006, p.49). As for the African comparative advantages, the focus must be based on long 
term programs that attract FDI into vital sectors like natural resources that needed heavy 
investment.  However, many with abundant natural resources have not even developed.  
 
In addition, countries in Sub- Saharan Africa (SSA) such as Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, and Madagascar among others have ongoing Integrated Industrial 
Development Programs that cover wide range of development issues including major 
components relating to FDI and capacity building of local intermediary institutions 
(UNIDO, 2002, p.2). Among the new schemes involving many countries include African 
Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) (UNCTAD, 2003, p.37) and New Partnership for 
African Development (NEPAD) that has prospect in infrastructure and energy investment 
development and among other priorities. For this case, NEPAD suits SSA as it needs 
more of development administration that has been neglected in economic development 
paradigm.  
 
2.2.2 Determinants and Motivations of FDI: 
Pull factors of FDI to developing countries are favored by growing markets, rising costs 
of factor production in home economies, host government policy frameworks, business 
facilitation.
1  
 
 
_____________________ 
1 Government policies include competition, incentives, transparent governance, investment 
in infrastructure and property rights and minimal foreign exchange regulations. 
Macroeconomic and political factors include uncertainty; strong currency, political stability 
and common monetary area (UNCTAD, 2006, p.157). 
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Similarly, UNCTAD (1999, p.91; 2003, p.85), grouped FDI determinants into host policy 
frameworks, economic and business facilitation while Wei and Balasurbramanyam 
(2004, p. 178) grouped them into: (1) those related to the objectives of the prospective 
investors; and (2) the policy framework of host countries. They argued that non-mineral 
countries in Africa would attract FDI through macroeconomic stability. But even the 
macroeconomic stability works well only for exploitation of the mineral resources rather 
than in non – minerals.   
 
According to Kehal (2004, p.22), locational decisions by TNCs do not only depend on 
opening up an economy, but are primarily driven by economic fundamentals including 
natural resources, availability of markets and high growth rates. However, Moosa (2002, 
p.50) recognized other factors other than locational and market size. These are political 
risks and country risks; tax policies; trade barriers; and government regulations. Hence 
the importance of market size as a determinant of investment location has diminished; 
even a small country can now compete favorably for FDI, given that they can provide 
sufficiently attractive conditions for foreign investors.
2  
 
__________________________________ 
2 Until recently, there was a strong consensus in the literature that FDI is mainly attracted 
by strong economic fundamentals (UNCTAD, 2003a, 31). These are market size and 
income level, skills, infrastructure and other resources that facilitate efficient 
specialization of production, trade policies, and political and macroeconomic stability as 
other central determinants. Investment incentives were seen as relatively minor 
determinants of FDI decisions. Globalization has changed this picture and made 
incentives more important determinant of international investment decisions. More than 
100 countries provided various FDI incentives already in the mid-1990s, and dozens more 
introduced such incentives since the few countries compete for FDI without any form of 
subsidies today. 
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If the importance of market size has declined, then China case disapproves this 
proposition. In fact, market size and natural resource availability are the most important 
factors for FDI attraction in host economies. Other factors like subsidies and political 
stability are necessary conditions needed for exploitation of natural resources and 
production to supply goods and services.  
 
According to UNCTAD (1998, p.106), TNCS are resource-seeking, market-seeking, 
efficiency-seeking and strategic asset seeking investment. Therefore, the different 
motives could have different impacts in host economies. FDI in SSA are resource seeking 
mainly, in fuel, oil and mineral resources. Such investments tend to be less sensitive to 
policy environments. For example, Angola, an oil rich country was ranked first in terms 
of FDI receipt in 1998 among African countries (UNCTAD, 1998, p.166; 1999, p.46). In 
addition to natural resources, FDI in Africa depends on economic infrastructure, and to 
lesser extent the size of domestic economy (UNCTAD, 1995, p.85; OECD, 2002, p.8). 
 
In terms of rating; the degree of influence on profitability of investments was seen as the 
factor with the highest influence, followed by state physical infrastructure, political and 
economic outlook and last is regional markets (UNCTAD, 1999. p.47&50–52). Further 
more, the rate of return in Africa was more profitable than in any other developing 
countries though the share has been declining. While the returns on investment can be 
high in Africa (OECD, 2003, p.7), the effects are more counterbalanced by high taxes and 
significant risk of capital losses. Rising corporate profits and high commodity prices 
boosted FDI inflows in 2005 to a historical high of $31 billion from $17 in 2004 
(UNCTAD, 2006, p.40–44). However, the region continues to exhibit weaknesses that 
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constraints its ability to attract quality FDI. For instance the continent has poor 
infrastructure, skills and technical based and general education enrollment.  
 
2.2.3 Fiscal incentives:  
a) Tax Incentives: 
Tax incentives are more explicit than the implicit tax holidays, and are offered as 
investment allowances. There is overwhelming evidence that, relative to other factors, 
fiscal incentives are only a minor element in the locational decisions of TNCs 
(UNCTAD, 1995, p.298). However, the impact is not negligible: if one country offers 
and the other does not, ceteris peribus, foreign investors could be influenced in their 
location decisions between countries.  Factors such as market size, skills level and 
economic stability and regulations remain the most important.  
 
More so, TNC executives now readily admit the increasing importance of tax incentives 
in investment decisions (UNCTAD, 2003a, p.31) in the sense that they influence FDI 
inflows.  It is possible that the competition between potential investment locations within 
countries will raise subsidy levels so much that most of the benefits are shifted from host 
countries to foreign investors.
3
 OECD (2005, p.6) further pointed out that investors are 
more likely to be attracted to the locations when existing investors give positive advice.  
 
___________________________ 
3In addition, costs of subsidization invite rent seeking FDI. For example, tax holidays and 
tax breaks may appear simple and innocuous forms of incentives, but are likely to lead to 
transfer pricing and other distortions as firms try to shift as many transactions as 
possible to  activities with tax preferences, or set up new firms as the tax preferences of 
existing firms expire (UNCTAD, 2003a, p.33). 
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This puts the government in a situation of making already existing investors have positive 
perception of the host environments for doing businesses. However, tax incentives are 
used as politically ideology to appease people on government’s commitment to promote 
development per se. However, tax incentives should be used to attract capital and 
technology for required purpose; spur industrial growth in particular geographical 
locations where infrastructure is inadequate among others. This is because investment 
incentives tend to benefit mostly foot loose industries which operate in short term basis. 
They are engaged in producing consumption goods and services, and their costs of 
relocation to neighboring countries are low, export oriented investment, in countries or 
regions that are similar to neighboring countries and in regions where the business 
conditions are favorable.  
 
b) Tax Holiday: 
Tax holidays are offered for a specific period of time, to particular types of investments, 
that government wants to promote. Investing enterprises pay no taxes specified in 
agreements until the grace period ends. Tax holidays are essential in quick capital 
recovery and maintain greater liquidity in early years (Seid, 2002, p.40). Thus reducing 
risks, provide large benefits as soon as companies begin earning income, and are more 
valuable than tax incentive (Bora, 2002, p.280). Tax holidays can further be 
counterproductive if they contribute to attracting more investors of the "wrong kind", 
which is certainly the case in countries where basic fundamentals are not yet in place. 
Even still, a firm at infantry level benefits less from tax holidays and a lengthy exemption 
is costly to the host country. However, they primarily benefit short-term investments, 
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which are often taken in so-called footloose industries. Further drawback is that, the cost 
of administering incentive regimes result in delays and uncertainty for investors. They 
have been also significant sources of corruption, screening out desirable investments, and 
detrimental to the process of developing competitive market and sound policy making
. 4 
Despite the negative situation, many poor African countries rely on tax holiday and 
import exemptions, while industrial countries allow investment allowances or accelerated 
depreciation. An incentive is correctly targeted if it is invested in capital because it 
encourages companies to take long-term planning.  
 
2.2.4 Investment Promotion Agencies and Export Promotion 
Zones (EPZs): 
Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) are more effective in a country with a good 
investment climate than only in a poor one, and is the obvious solution for SSA (OECD, 
2005, p.6-7). Thus, IPAs role should be in image building under regional promotion since 
many prospective investors think regionally. Image building yields result in attracting 
FDI, but it is still less in policy advocacy and it is good for countries with good 
investment climate, hence, countries with poor investment should not spend too many 
resources on IPAs. In addition, Morriset (2003, p.14 quoted in OECD, 2005, p.5) finds 
that small agencies are not really effective in attracting FDI, and IPAs which spent more 
money on policies were more successful in attracting investors, possibly because of the 
role of such advocacy that leads to improvements on investment climate.  
____________________________ 
4The impact of tax policy may significantly depend on the tax instruments used by the 
host country. The effectiveness of tax policy and incentives is likely to vary depending on 
the MNC activities and on its motivation to invest abroad (Bora, 2002, p. 273 – 285) 
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However, one-stop shop becomes more of a one stop, adding a red tape to investors. 
Decision-making is in a single authority within single organization and even line ministry 
resists ceding their regulatory to another agency.  
 
 Most economies have Export Promotion Zones (EPZs) supplied with improved 
infrastructure and special incentive packages (Sied, 2002, p.41), however (Hill, 1990, 
p.35-36 quoted in Bora, 2002, p.184) pointed out that EPZs though, have marginal impact 
on development and sometimes may not sometimes develop linkages within the economy 
especially to the new entrants. Foreign exporters have historically found it more 
profitable to establish production facilities within the tariff wall than to serve the market 
from an overseas location. For examples, the tax concessions to promote upgrading in 
R&D in Singapore and Ireland were based on performance requirements of export 
promotion, linkages and training schemes. OECD (2005, p.11-12) added that Ireland and 
Singapore had successful stories based on three lessons for other economies: a) programs 
of linkages are expensive; b) Irish Development Authority had strong powers within the 
government to shape and implement policy; c) both countries had large pool of skills and 
small investors necessary for linkages development. Hence, host economies seeking FDI 
need to develop the local capability needed for exploiting the opportunities brought in by 
FDI or else remain in enclaves of export promotion zones that have limited impact.  
 
2.2.6 Performance requirements: 
Developing countries have FDI restrictive policy of performance requirements 
(UNCTAD, 2003a, p.63), normally done by IPAs (Seid, 2002, p.38), such as purchases of 
local capital goods, raw materials, intermediate goods and services, recruitment, 
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employment and training practices, the proportion of output exported, trade balancing, 
technological transfer, information provided on intra-firm pricing practices, and types of 
production methods utilized. Host economies mainly use them to promote and protect 
local industries; provide information on intra-firm practices and prevent pricing abuses 
and tax evasion; foster transfer of technology; and also a means of serving national goals. 
But, such practices protect inefficient local firms and also exclude investors.  
 
However, the right to regulate (UNCTAD, 2003d, p.216) FDI activities should be 
recognized in the interest of host/home countries, traders and investors and be 
compatible, though, it has been not as easy as it sounds. Among the measures that will 
certainly hurt, not only investors but also long-term interests of host countries are 
negative post-investment changes such as expropriation; and insufficient notice when a 
new regulation is implemented. Morisset and Neso (2002) examined administrative 
barriers to FDI in 32 developing countries. They demonstrated that the quality of 
investment climate plays a significant role in the location decision of many investors. The 
ultimate case would be where a country has abolished all controls and relies on market 
forces and competition to shape investment and prevent abuses (Stoever, 2002, p.50), but 
the scenario is neither possible nor desirable.  
 
It is important to note that, performance requirements differ among countries depending 
on their level of development, endowments of natural and other resources, market size, 
development strategy, among other factors. Hence, the right to regulate in the current 
context involves (1) promoting domestic development priorities and linkages; and (2) 
protecting the public welfare from possible negative impacts. 
5
 Even many countries 
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which traditionally maintained an open policy towards FDI now impose restrictions on 
flows and activities of FDI, due to the rapid changes in FDI whereby those who used to 
be traditional exporters of FDI are increasingly becoming major importers of capital 
(Seid, 2002, p.34). This has become a threat to infant industry development and would 
reduce host economies to deepen their capacity to produce.  
 
TNCs may want to invest in spite of performance requirements and other restrictions 
(UNCTAD, 2003a, p.71). For example, China and India have managed to attract a huge 
volume of FDI inflows despite stringent performance requirements enforced with respect 
to exports, ownership and local contents. This shows that high levels of economic 
freedom are not clearly correlated with high level of FDI. China is the leading destination 
of FDI, but ranks (112 out of 155) in the Index of Economic Freedom (World Bank, 
2004). Similarly, the benefits accruing to the host country may greatly outweigh the 
adverse effects.  
 
2.2.7 Decentralization: 
Most countries have centralized process of dealing with investment process (Robinson, 
1987, p.26–29). In a decentralized process, technical skills of departments are brought in 
for negotiations like for tax expert and finance, laws and labour issues. Agencies monitor 
their terms of agreements and administrators learn from the past. However, there is no 
evaluation of projects’ benefits to the economy and individual ministries may give little 
attention to policy issues and also costly to investors.  
_________________________ 
5UNCTAD (2003a, p.216) Trade and liberalization can only be achieved in the context of 
appropriate and effective domestic regulatory environments 
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In a centralized system like IPAs, negotiations are quick and there is high prediction of 
outcomes and further, consider the generally impact in the economy. The problem is that, 
there is separate negotiation and implementation that remain at the ministry level.  
 
However, corruption arises when passive regulations exist and government officials have 
discretion in applying them. It becomes worst when regulations lack simplicity and 
transparency. Corruption, combined with administrative weakness, can both undermine 
policy reform and repel FDI as Asiedu (2004, p.46) suggests. Too much regulations lead 
to delays and add costs to firms. 
6 
The level of corruption or lack of good governance is 
expected to influence the administrative costs. Even the degree of political freedom, 
openness, and existing legal framework affects the capacity of bureaucrats or incumbent 
enterprises to exploit rents from administrative procedures.  
 
In terms of negative influence; ranked orderly, extortion and bribery deter FDI most and 
others are high administrative cost of doing business and access to capital (UNCTAD, 
1999. p.50–52). Corruption and poor governance appear to have more significant 
deterrent to FDI in Africa than elsewhere (Wei and Balasurbramanyam, 2004, p. 178). 
Therefore, combined with inhibiting factors, corruption makes African countries lag 
behind other developing countries in terms of attracting FDI. 
 
________________________ 
6In countries, some of the operational procedures can also be needed at the entry, such as 
import and foreign exchange licensing. However, because of trade and financial 
liberalization efforts, those are less and less frequent (UNCTAD, 2003a, p. 189-192, 211, 
213, and 216). 
 
 21 
In short, most host governments have liberalized and privatized their economies, created 
investment promotion agencies and export promotion zones to attract FDI. In addition, 
host economies further provided fiscal incentives to make their locations attractive. 
However, the determinants and motivations for FDI to invest in host economies depend 
on host characteristics like natural resource availability, market size and growth rates,  
not only on policy improvements. These are dilemmas to host economies on policies they 
would have to implement so as to attract FDI without waste.   
 
2.3    Basic Characteristics of Foreign Direct Investment 
Enterprises in Host Economies: 
2.3.1 Introduction: 
This part gives the different forms of FDI inflows in host economies, the sectoral 
orientation in host economies, and entry through greenfield, M&As and joint ventures.  
 
2.3.2 Forms of FDI inflows: 
FDI inflows include equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra–company loans 
(UNCTAD, 1995, 1996, 1997, & Moosa, 2002, p.2). The equity capital is the foreign 
investors’ purchases of share in an enterprise in a foreign country; reinvested earnings are 
injected funds on new projects in the host country; and intra-company loans include short 
or long term lending between the parent and its affiliates.
7  
_______________________ 
5Indeed, FDI in the host country can be import substituting (production of goods 
previously imported), export increasing FDI (seeking increase export of raw material and 
intermediary goods), Government initiated FDI (offer incentives to investors to eliminate 
B.O.T deficit), trade oriented (generating excess demand for imports and excess exports at 
the origin term of trade), expansionary FDI exploits firm specific competitive advantage in 
the host economy (sale growth both at home and abroad). Defensive FDI seeks labor in 
the host country with the aim of reducing cost of production (Moosa, 2002, p.2). 
 22 
Indeed, different countries often have diverse conventions as to what constitutes the 
ownership of the company from both the management and assets point of view (Wood, 
200, p.16). For instance, can be 10% or 20 % depending on host measurements of FDI. 
FDI intention therefore, relies on having a management voice in enterprises either in 
parent or subsidiary enterprises and such intentions is always demonstrated by taking the 
majority of the equity share of more than 10 per cent.  
 
2.3.2 Sectoral orientation of FDI: 
 FDI has now moved mainly to services and technology from primary sector (UNCTAD, 
1993, p.61–62) demonstrating the structural changes in economic activities and FDI itself 
as a conduit for economic integration. The most attractive industries for FDI were 
telecommunications, food and beverages, tourism, mining and quarrying, textiles and 
leather (UNCTAD, 1999, p.50). FDI in services is increasing particularly in 
telecommunications, electricity and management and trade (UNCTAD, 2004, p.45) due 
to the growing importance of services through privatization that has problems without 
regulations.  This suggests that many African countries receive FDI in non–minerals.  
 
2.3.3 Entry Modes of Foreign Direct Investment: 
Entry mode choices of FDI enterprises occur through full equity control of greenfield 
(new investment), M&As, and Joint Venture (either greenfield or acquisition) (Bora, 
2002, p.10, UNCTAD, 2006, p.110).  However, FDI modes of entry between acquisitions 
and greenfield are affected by the production and transportation costs,  government 
policies in the host countries with respect to trade barriers (like import substitution); the 
marketing factors to destined markets; and oligopolistic reactions that one firm induces 
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the others to follow suit (Moosa, 2002, p.58). M&As as modes of entry in services lead 
over greenfields (UNCTAD, 2005, p.111-113) with $716billion in 2005.  
 
a)  Greenfield: 
 Greenfield refers to the investment in projects that entail new production facilities such 
as offices, buildings, plants and factories and movement of intangible capital (UNCTAD, 
2006, p.15) and always adds to the production capacity of the host–country through 
capital formation and employment, and valued added (Moosa, 2002, p.13). Therefore, 
greenfield is suitable for developing economies because it can be directed to specific 
sectoral priorities, even in promoting linkages among others. 
 
b) Cross – border Mergers and Acquisitions (Mass): 
 Cross – border M&As involve a partial or full take over or merging of capital, assets and 
liabilities of existing enterprises in a country by TNCs from other countries (UNCTAD, 
2006, p.16). Collective investment between private equity firms and the various financial 
institutions, involving mutual funds and hedge funds, has become a growing source of 
FDI through M&As, and are the popular mode of investment for firms wishing to protect, 
consolidate and advance their global competitive positions, by selling off divisions some 
parts of divisions that fall outside their scope of core competencies and acquiring 
strategic assets that enhance competitiveness (UNCTAD, 1996, p.7-15). They were 
rampant in the 1980s through sales and purchases of public enterprises that were loosing 
their comparative advantages. The motivations for M&As (UNCTAD, 1999, p. 101; 
2000, p. 144 – 149) are due to the privatization of state owned enterprises; globalization; 
and economies of scale,  as well as,  Regional Trade Blocks (Dunning (1998, p.41) to 
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protect positions and market shares which previously come from exports.  M&As are 
influenced by the speed and access to proprietary assets (UNCTAD, 2000, p.140) and can 
be fundamentally classified (UNCTAD, 2000, p.101) into: (a) horizontal – between firms 
in the same industry; (b) vertical involving client – supplier of buyer – seller relationships 
usually for reducing uncertainty and transaction costs, linkages and economies of scale; 
(c) conglomeration – usually between companies in unrelated activities to diversify risks 
and economies of scale.  
 
 M&As may yield significant economic benefits (Bora, 2002, p.10, UNCTAD, 2006, 
p.17) when investors make a long-term commitment to economic restructuring of firms -
acquired, investors are likely to inherit local linkages that may have been established over 
a considerable period of time (Enderwick, 2005, p.98), rescuing ailing companies in the 
developing countries (UNCTAD, 2006, p. 17). Investors gaining access to markets 
(Mossa, 2002, p.13) but host countries prefer to retain local control on domestic markets.  
However, M&As can be dubious to development value (Bora, 2002, p.10) if they lead to 
changes in ownerships without changing or adding productive capacity, facilitating 
transfer pricing,  rationalization, and also being practiced on the basis of anti competition 
in the host economy.  
 
In fact, the recent trends towards M&As reflect the strategic choice by TNCs and hosts’ 
privatization programs across the continents during the 1990s. However, these are rather 
sellers, than buyers due to changes in national policies.  
 
 
 25 
c) Joint Ventures: 
Joint Venture (home country and other companies) provides technical knowledge and 
ability to raise finance and utilization of the other local knowledge of bureaucracy, 
regulations and the laws (Moosa, 2002, p.13). Joint venture has emerged as an alternative 
entry mode due to possession of complementary assets; opportunities for collusions; and 
barriers to full integration as well as a means of alleviating risks, especially the risks of 
take over (Moosa, 2002, p.58). Joint ventures can be useful to foreign investors due to 
diversification of risks, providing local partners to mediate with the governments, large 
pool of resources and technology and local entrepreneurial class will emerge through the 
acquisition of managerial and business skills (Seid, 2002, p.36). The basic motivations 
favoring joint ventures alternatively take the form of vertical, horizontal and 
diversification based joint venture (Robison, 1987, p.80 – 81). These can be an 
alternative strategy for developing countries seeking investment in infrastructure. It 
accommodates local development initiatives by governments such as energy 
development.  
 
d) Implications: 
The implications of the modes entry on development depend on the context in the host 
country, M&As and greenfield are rarely perfect substitute for each other (UNCTAD 
(2002, p.160). Therefore their degree of success depends on a number of host variables 
such as the level of economic development (high level of development favors M&A 
while developing countries are more likely to use greenfield); FDI policy of using 
greenfield; institutional factors of corporate governance and ownership; and financial 
crisis in the host country. Thus every mode of entry has mixed economic effects and TNC 
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characteristics and orientation relate to their impacts. Most developing countries prefer 
greenfields FDI over M&As (UNCTAD, 1999, p.102–103) because greenfield adds on 
capital investment, a pre–requisite for development, offers technology which local 
investors do not have, introduce innovation management and linkages with the local 
investors. However, M&As success depends on conditions under which they were 
created such as solving financial constraints of performing assets. The underlying 
argument for developing countries is that M&A is less beneficial than greenfield 
investments unless rescuing the ailing industries. FDI and employment creation 
(UNCTAD, 1994, p.166) depends on the types of initial investment (mode of entry) such 
as  greenfield or M&As. Employment prospect can improve at a later stage as firms adapt 
to new competition and introduce new products.  
 
In other words, FDI into host economies take the forms of greenfield, M&As and joint 
ventures. However, the recent entry modes favored M&As and mostly in services such as 
telecom and financial sector which are essential but the most important because 
developing countries could benefit more from FDI in terms of spillovers.  
 
 
2.4 Benefits of Foreign Direct Investment via Spillovers 
in Host Economies: 
2.4.1 Introduction: 
This subsection emphasizes the benefits of FDI in Host Economies through spillovers 
rather than helping the host economy with low saving capacity and weak financial 
intermediation. These include the role of FDI in reducing poverty, creating employment, 
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promoting technological transfers, and promoting production linkages. In addition, costs 
of FDI are also discussed which occurred during the process of attracting FDI.  
 
Evidence from the FDI related literature (Klein et al, 2001; OECD, 2002; Bende-
Nabende, 2002; Bora, 2002; Asiedu, 2004; Kehal, 2004) demonstrates FDI role in 
economic development of host countries; mainly in terms of human development, 
technological transfers and capital formation, international trade, and competition and 
enterprise development. Effects of FDI in the host country are classified into economic, 
political and social effects (Moosa, 2002, p. 69-73) while Enderwick (2005, p.102) 
further categorizes the impact of FDI into primary effects by looking at aggregate 
benefits and costs that accrue to an economy and secondary impacts that related to the 
spillovers from foreign affiliates to local firms. These inflows of FDI into host economies 
have implications for economies seeking growth and development (Enderwick, 2005, 
p.94), including careful investment in assets and infrastructure, coordinated integration of 
policies, and the avoidance of expensive incentive to attract FDI. These can only be 
viable to host economies when they design policy that increases the absorptive capacity. 
According to OECD (2003, p.14) and Bende-Nabende (2002, p.124), the benefits of FDI 
are of two types: (1) saving countries of low domestic savings and weak financial 
intermediation, and (2) is spillovers. Spillovers therefore occur in five ways: transfers of 
technology, enterprise development and restructuring, integration, bolstering competition 
and supporting human capital formation. In this case, FDI policies need to discriminate 
between sectors or take certain wastes.  
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2.4.2 FDI role in Reducing Poverty: 
While FDI may support development in an aggregate term, more attention should be 
focused on the distribution of gains from FDI. This is due to the fact that there is no 
direct link between FDI and poverty reduction (Klein et al, 2001. p.2-5; Sida, 2004), but 
there are some possible indirect links: (1) if FDI contributes to export growth, 
productivity and finances balance of payments; (2) if FDI increases employment it may 
move other people out of poverty; (3) foreign firms pay higher wages than local firms for 
workers of similar qualifications. Therefore, the evidence that FDI contributes to 
economic development is encouraging rather than compelling, because growth itself does 
not guarantee poverty reduction because of inequality in redistribution of resources. Te 
Velde (2001, p.6-7)  added that FDI contributes in raising the tax base in the host 
countries, where increased domestic revenue may be used to build infrastructure and can 
also be spent on health, education and training. FDI remains one of the most effective 
tools in the fight against poverty because net debt flows have become less important 
(Klein et al, 2001, p.1-3).  
 
 But developing host economies rarely spend money in productive activities that would 
greatly reduce poverty instead security sector dominates public expenditures and ranks 
high in term of importance. More so, FDI can only benefit host economies if there are 
best practices of encouraging linkages since most people might not have the expert they 
need in the employment area. This can reduce income poverty.  
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2.4.3   FDI and Employment: 
FDI has not had significant impact on employment, skill formation and growth in Africa 
as it has had in other areas such as East Asian countries with the exception of Botswana 
and Mauritius (Klein et al, 2004, p.9). Still in labor markets, TNCs have often been 
accused of “exploiting” labor in developing countries. However, it is generally accepted 
that FDI does not permanently change the level of unemployment, but can have a short 
run effect and result in permanent changes in real wages (Caves 1996, quoted in Bora, 
2002, p.235). However, (Sida, 2004) noted that a great deal in manufacturing is likely to 
result in employment of highly skilled labor and thereby only indirect benefit to the poor. 
In short, developing host economies need to improve on their skills and general education 
so as to gain from TNCs presence in their economies.  
 
2.4.4 FDI and Technology: 
The level of technological competence affects firms’ market share by producing product 
quality. Technology promotes economic development by increasing factor productivity, 
changing exports in favor of research intensive product with higher growth potential.  
However, importing and mastering technologies in developing countries is not as simple 
due to extensive coordination problems, externalities, missing markets and cumulative 
effects. In developing countries, technology transfers occur through TNC affiliates, joint 
ventures, franchising capital good sales, licensing, technical assistance, sub-contracting 
or original equipment manufacturer (Nabende-Bende, 2002, p.143). However, benefits 
from technology transfers by TNCs should not be taken for granted unless: they 
economize on the local scarce resources, directly or indirectly contributing to economic 
growth; have impact not only on GDP, but also on the livelihood and employment 
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possibilities for the people; integrating the host government development planning 
process and strategies, and do not create ‘technological enclaves’ or regional imbalances' 
(quoted from Manson, 1994; in Bende-Nabende 2002, p.144). 
 
A local firm may improve on its productivity by copying technology used by TNC 
affiliates operating in the local market. TNCs may also facilitate the transfer and 
diffusion of technology by signaling to local firms that certain products exist, that there is 
a market for them and how to produce them through the so-called ‘demonstration effect’. 
The entry of TNCs may lead to technology spillovers through competition that TNCs 
may force local firms to search for and implement more efficient technology. TNCs may 
need to undertake research and development to adapt parent company technologies for 
products to suit the local market and be more readily adaptable to local conditions (Wong 
1995 quoted in Bora, 2002, p.237). The importance of technology in developing countries 
have made OECD (Moosa, 2002, p.93) to issue guidelines urging TNCs to ensure that 
their activities are compatible with the technology plans of the host countries; adopt 
practices that allow the transfer and rapid diffusion of technology; address local market 
needs in an exercise pertaining technology; license technology on reasonable terms and 
conditions; and to develop ties with local university and research.  
 
In sum, the role of governments is to arbitrate technology transfers by developing and 
promoting domestic capabilities. This ca de done by having good educational base, 
strengthen technological institutions, encourage firms in export sector to employ new 
technology that advances their competitiveness. 
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2.4.5 Production Linkages:  
Production linkages are direct backward and forward linkages subsumed in economic 
development. FDI facilitates linkages between foreign affiliates and local firms, eases 
access to larger markets and resilience to shocks (UNCATAD, 1995, p.127). The impact 
of inward FDI adds capital stock that increase productivity and induces series of 
multiplier effects leading to expansion of indigenous firms (UNCTAD, 1995, p. 202 -
209).  Linkages can be done with local suppliers, marketing intermediation and 
franchising and licensing.  FDI influences growth by raising factor productivity in the 
host country mainly through: (1) linkages between FDI and trade flows and (2) spillovers 
and other externalities (OECD, 2002, p.8). Developing countries always have poor 
technology for the development of linkages. However, they can allow linkages to develop 
naturally (OECD, 2005, p.11).  Hence backward linkages lead to spillovers while forward 
linkages are also seemed important for increasing necessary competition (UNCTAD, 
2006b, p. 178). However, the benefits are accepted but the magnitude is less provable 
because of weak policies that hold back the benefits. 
 
2.4.6 Costs of Foreign Direct Investment: 
The effect of FDI can crowd-out or crowd-in investment by domestic firms (Bende-
Nabende, 2002, p.150-153 &UNCTAD, 1999, p.212-214). Crowd-out may result from 
increase in the host country’s interest rates when foreign firms borrow locally under 
conditions of scarcity and the use of superior assets thus justifying the need for protection 
of infant industry in developing economies. But, crowd-out on inefficient domestic firms 
may be desirable in the host country since FDI introduces dynamic competition and 
flexibility. However, crowding-in takes place when investment by foreign affiliates 
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stimulates new investment in the downstream or upstream production by other foreign or 
domestic producers or increases efficiency of financial intermediaries.  
 
The analysis of economic and non economic costs of FDI have been discussed in the 
literature (Caves, 1996; Casey, 2003; Petras, 2005). FDI can substitute good jobs with 
bad ones; reduces real wages; facilitates high import propensity; causes deterioration in 
the host country’s trade balance; transfers technology back home, compromising the host 
technology secrets; “crowding out” local capital and public initiative, and even local 
borrowing as well as creating  'boom and bust' in the economy; manipulates prices 
through intra-corporate transactions; erodes tax bases of other countries, and distorts 
trade and investment patterns and undermines the fairness, neutrality and broad social 
acceptance of tax system generally. Also, differences in environmental standards between 
countries may influence TNCs to invest in “dirty” industries in countries with low 
environmental standards exacerbating environmental degradation that may be already 
occurring (Bora, 2002, p.236). This suggests that the environmental policies among 
different countries are cost factors that can influence the location of TNC investments in 
dirty industries. Moosa (2002, p.73-77) acknowledged that TNCs can lower growth in 
developing country if; profits are repatriated rather than reinvested; and investment in 
manufacturing is detrimental to developing country's balance of payments because of 
high import contents as well as the mechanism of transfer pricing of TNCs. However, 
host policies are needed to minimize such practices.  
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In short, host developing economies can benefit well from FDI only if they have 
developed the absorptive capacity through training; linkages are needed in attracting 
specific kinds of projects.  In addition, linkages need favorable conditions in the host 
country. These should be resulting from government policy especially in local contents of 
significance projects to host economies.   
 
2.5 Policy Options for Managing Foreign Direct Investment 
Desirability in Host Economies: 
2.5.1: Introduction: 
This subsection examines policy options which host economies can use to make FDI 
work for the economy’s development objectives. These include privatization and 
liberalization, promoting FDI role in infrastructural services, different policy 
interventions, regional integration, fiscal incentives, and the role of investment promotion 
agencies. Also, examples are drawn from the “emerging giants” and the South East Asian 
countries that have successfully managed to benefit from FDI.  
 
2.5.2 Further liberalization and privatization: 
The future of FDI policy depends on further liberalization of trade and investment 
policies. The state’s role will be based on attracting the Headquarters of FDI (UNCTAD 
(1993, p.29&33). Especially in Africa that needs further diversification of the production 
structure towards manufacturing and services; ability to enlarge markets and foster high 
growth rates; improving on infrastructure including improvements from ODA; and ability 
of South Africa to become an investment pole for SSA. These policy factors include 
adopting macroeconomic reforms, including alleviating debt burdens, further 
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liberalization of FDI and related regimes, including those in primary and secondary 
sectors, introduction and expansion of privatization programs.  
 
However, while pursuing the above, the “dos” in host economies (UNCTAD, 2003a, 
p.141) include a non-discriminatory, stable and predictable trade and investment 
environment; and a good competition policy. The “don’ts” include avoiding certain 
elements in policy approaches such as “subsidy race” being typically both discriminatory 
and expensive, lowering of domestic standards to attract investors is a bad solution for 
all, and host country rules or regulations that may be risky make investment less effective 
are also poor solutions. This is because even if the importance market size may have 
become less important as a determinant of FDI location, it remains a key factor. 
Therefore, policy implications for investment liberalization include: (1) liberalization of 
entry and operation to increase competition; (2) limiting market power inducements; (3) 
minimizing anti -competition cartels.  
 
In other words, host economies need stable and predictable policy and macroeconomic 
environment. Further liberalization and liberalization should be based on factors 
determining FDI attraction in a particularly host economy and the investment 
opportunities. This can be in sector where governments have been able to exploit but are 
of strategic to the host’s development goals.    
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2.5.3 Foreign Direct Investment Role in Host 
Infrastructure: 
The role of FDI in infrastructure in developing countries can be channeled through 
greenfield. For instance, governments of Vietnam, China and Malaysia used build operate 
– transfer scheme (UNCATAD, 1996, p.22). This solves the infrastructure problems in 
developing countries. Host economies with a minimum necessary telecommunicating 
infrastructure can now leapfrog stages of development by adopting the new technologies 
like cellular telephones (Nabende-Bende, 2002, p.143). Host policies related to services 
should be used to promote universal access to telecommunications, through targeted 
incentives (UNCTAD, 2004, p.201). For landlocked developing countries, UNCTAD 
(2003b, p.7-8) pointed out the importance of attracting FDI that is not sensitive to 
distances. However, most developing host economies put restrictions on FDI in some 
infrastructure services. This is intended to safeguard the welfare of citizens; national 
security and price ceiling sometimes make such opportunities not being attractive.  
 
 
2.5.4 Different Intervention Approaches: 
UNCTD (2006b) defines four different intervention approaches: (1) passive open door 
policy involving limited policy interventions or no industrial policy; (2) open door policy 
involving selective interventions to improve on supply conditions; (3) strategic targeting 
of FDI; and (4) restrictive policy. However, Alternburg (2000, cited in UNCTAD, 2006b, 
p.8) argues that approaches 1&4 are not sufficient to exploit the opportunities from FDI. 
The optimum for many low-income countries will be near the second approach and only 
if local capabilities are developed. However, such assertions are disapproved by China, 
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which employed restrictive policy while Singapore and Malaysia targeted specific types 
of FDI to deepened linkages in manufacturing rather than only employing open door 
policy.  
  
However, UNCTAD (2006b) called the first policy intervention as minimalist approach 
which focuses on the basic investment foundations and the second policy as an 
encouragement approach focusing slightly on a more of interventionism to solve market 
failures. The third is called, selective policies for specific firms or activities of strategic 
importance. Lastly, is the restrictive approach, which is a hard policy like market 
reservation for certain companies and mandatory local contents. Furthermore, domestic 
content is extremely useful to developing countries but question is how governments can 
apply is still an interesting point for the discussion. If domestic content is done for 
strengthening linkages, then government also needs to the market failure of imperfect 
information of the potential suppliers or cheap location (UNCTAD, 2001, p.164).  In 
short, domestic firms and foreign affiliates should be brought together in the promotion 
of specific linkage programs. In fact, there is no single best-practiced strategy within 
which policies are framed, but depends partly on pre-conditions in host economies. The 
message is simple. FDI policies should be in line with development strategy being 
pursued in host economies.  
 
2.5.5 Regional Integration:  
Regional integration brings light to the market size (Sida, 2004). It can attract FDI due to 
the greater financial stability, better policy coordination, improved infrastructure and a 
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more favorable investment climate that usually accomplished it. Hence, governments’ 
role is to demonstrate “political will” so as to coordinate regional policies in some areas 
and give up certain options for the benefit of regional integration (Bende–Nabende, 2002, 
p.187). In fact, regional integration has become a global phenomenon that any country 
joining benefit from the alternative it offers rather than relying only on tax incentives. 
Hence, regional integration is a catalyst for both industrialization and economic growth.    
 
2.5.6 Giving Fiscal Incentives: 
The policy challenge for developing host economies is to attract FDI without financial 
incentives, but through competition of providing fiscal incentives usually referred to as 
the “dowry chasing” (Robinson, 1987, p.79), the “race to zero” (UNCTAD, 1999, p.290).  
Other commentators see fiscal incentives to attract FDI be intended only for correcting 
the market failures (UNCTAD, 1995, p.290). Fiscal incentive schemes for TNCs appear 
to increase, both in terms of conditions attached to them and the variety of options they 
provide.  The activities of FDI favored by fiscal incentives include: (1) priority industries; 
(2) regional development; (3) exporting; (4) innovation, research and development. For 
example, Malaysia used targeted incentive (UNCTAD, 2002, p.206); and setting EPZs 
provided with infrastructure, and removing the red tape confines within a limited areas. 
 
But there is one element missing, interests of governments and TNCs are quite different. 
Governments provide fiscal incentives to development while TNCs use fiscal incentives 
to improve on their competitiveness since costs will be automatically reduced. Hence 
targeted incentives minimize the negative consequences of these different interests. 
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2.5.7 The role of Investment Promotion Agencies: 
Majority of host economies have moved away from the first generation policy (opening 
up an economy to FDI) and second generation (government marketing the locations) to 
third generation policy that involves targeting investors (UNCTAD, 2002, p.221). Third 
generation policy helps in attracting FDI to host development objectives, makes it 
possible to attract export oriented FDI rather resource–seeking FDI and  it is cost 
effectiveness compared to IPAs which attract many FDI of low quality. The targeting 
policy can still be directed to specific industries, activities and companies. Therefore, the 
need for an integrated approach to attract FDI in Africa involves improving on the 
national and international investment frame works, supporting national investment 
promotion efforts, promoting information dissemination and public–private dialogue and 
facilitating linkages (UNCTAD, 2003, 37&85). In a different perspective, most IPAs in 
Africa generally do investing marketing rather than targeted specific types of FDI that 
would change the economic structure, especially in countries with limited natural 
resources and small market size. This is because FDI in Africa in mainly attracted in 
countries with natural resources and oil deposits and hence the alternative for those 
without is only limited to the general marketing and improving on policy environments.  
 
2.5.8 International Experience:  
China benefited from FDI because of the rapid expansion of domestic market, gradual 
opening of the domestic market to FDI and improve relations with North Korea and 
Taiwan (UNCTAD, 1994, p.68 and Kehal, 2004, p.79). FDI policies had been designed 
to attract investors to act in the way that enhances the development impact by building 
local capacity using local suppliers and also upgrading local skills, technological 
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capabilities and infrastructure through mandatory requirements. Therefore, the vision of 
host economies can be drawn from past experiences and should be pursued as a broader 
policy to raise productivity. 
 
Hong Kong used passive-open door policy to TNCs and the government did not intervene 
to promote industrial development (UNCTAD, 1994, p.72) While Thailand and Malaysia 
pursued active industrial policies and promoted local enterprises in certain activities, but 
also adopted effectively open door, non interventionist policies in some export oriented 
industries. Singapore sought heavy TNCs participation in manufacturing, but intervened 
selectively to guide investors in technological activity thought to be desirable for 
industrial upgrading through Export Promotion Zones to reduce the transaction costs of 
investment (Te Velde, 2001, p.42-47). Republic of Korea and Taiwan maximized 
reliance on FDI in the form of technological transfers in the context of comprehensive set 
of industrial policies to deepen the manufacturing sector, promoting linkages and increase 
local capabilities. Ireland focused on attracting quality FDI rather than upgrading existing 
FDI and later emphasized linkages (Te Velde, 2001, p.42-47). While, example Malaysia 
and India have educational policy to shape absorptive capacity and SMEs linkages, 
appropriate local incentives for local sourcing and give research institutions incentives 
for their findings (OECD, 2005, p.11-12 & UNCTAD, 2006b, p.10-13). 
 
Hence, there are five broad categories of lessons which developing host economies can 
internalize from managing FDI in East Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Philippine) (UNCTAD, 2005, p.57): (a) crowding in requires a proactive macroeconomic 
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environment; (b) liberalization should proceed from a point of strength and be done 
strategically; (c) industrial policies matter; (d) strong and capable states are needed to 
bargain effectively with the large firms; (e) think regionally. This implies that any policy 
to be applied should be subjected to social and cost benefit analysis. Interestingly, the 
above experience shows that host economies can benefit from FDI, if it is seen to 
supplement home efforts. Hence host success on FDI policy depends on how particular 
circumstances and priorities are integrated in host development objectives. 
 
Hence, policy options to managing FDI benefits in host economies are numerous. Further 
privatization and liberation in host economies need to directed to areas which diversified 
the economic structures, which can shifting from agricultural production to the promotion 
on manufacturing and even liberalizing infrastructural services to foreign investors.  
More developing host economies need to use targeted policy of attracting FDI instead of 
relying only on the minimalist and interventionist policies. This has been proved by the 
strategy adopted by the South East Asian Countries.  
 
2.5.9 Summary of the discourse in the literature: 
Most of the literature reviewed confirms that the general directions for consensus on 
policy positions of most host economies are receptive to FDI. Developing Host 
Economies have adopted liberalization, privatized and continued to improve on the 
investment climate and others are searching for regional groupings. In addition, host 
economies are actively seeking a better understanding on the various elements of FDI 
including its determinants, impacts and policy implications. The relative significance of 
factors determining the host economy’s propensity to attract foreign direct investment 
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continues to be highly contextual and depends upon the specific types of FDI, motives 
and host policies related to FDI.  However, lots of uncertainties have been generated in 
the literature in developing host economies on the importance of FDI. The literature on 
FDI (Te Velde, 2001, Seid, 2002, Bende-Nadende, Kehal, 2004 and among others) has 
been concerned with the experience of advanced countries and economies in transitions, 
the “emerging giants” (china and India), and in addition to the experience of the East and 
South East Asian economies. Findings from these countries can not be applied 
simultaneously in all developing host economies, especially in Uganda which has got 
different socio-economic and political settings, a newly small emerging market-oriented 
economy that seeks to attract FDI. The available literature on FDI in SSA is scanty and 
not systematic enough in formulating a turn around strategy needed for Uganda to reap 
the potential benefits of FDI. Literature in Uganda (UNCTAD 2000a, Obwona, 2001, 
UNIDO, 2002, UN, 2004, Obwona and Egesa 2004) points out the important economic 
reforms conducted in the 1990s to attract foreign investors, general impacts of FDI and 
constraints in the economy. However, this literature concentrates mostly on the 
“Washington Consensus” that takes concern only at the macro policy. This study relates 
how the macro reforms have benefited Ugandans through FDI spillovers, and suggests 
policy options to be addressed. More so, some of the literature has been written for 
business organizations and portrays little evidence necessary for strategizing policy issues 
so as to answer questions regarding the achievement of quality and effectiveness in 
growth by using FDI as an alternative development paradigm to meet the national 
objectives. Moreover, the methodology used in some of the literature on FDI in Uganda 
was based more on surveys. However, this study analyzes documents so as to introject 
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out the best practiced issues emerging from investing enterprises in Uganda.  Therefore, 
this study first analyzed to what extent Government of Uganda supports FDI, by looking 
at the macroeconomic and incentives for FDI and how institutional weaknesses 
undermine government’s efforts. Secondly, this study looks at the basic characteristics of 
FDI enterprises in Uganda. Thirdly, analyzes the benefits of FDI only in terms of 
spillovers which have remained scarce in reviewed literature, and lastly, considers 
strategic issues which Government of Uganda has to improve on, so as to maximize the 
benefits from FDI.  
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CHAPTER THREE   
MACROECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES FOR FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN UGANDA’S ECONOMY   
3.1 Introduction  
This section evaluates the Government of Uganda’s (GOU) efforts to attract Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) into the economy since the 1990s. This study looks at the 
importance of macroeconomic and institutional incentives in attracting FDI in Uganda, 
and compares how institutional weaknesses undermine government’s efforts to use FDI 
as an alternative development paradigm. The investment code of 1991 provides pro-
investment incentives and guarantees against state’s expropriation. A turn around strategy 
was in 1997 and 2003 to provide generous incentives for capital investment.
1 Uganda’s 
economic growth appears to be stabilized at a lower rate of 4.7 per cent of GDP by 2003 
compared to the period between 1994-2002. Agricultural sector contributes to (34%) of 
GDP more than manufacturing (10% of GDP).
2
 Given the total population of 28.8 million 
in 2005,
 3
 Uganda has been classified among the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPCs) by the World Bank.
4
 Therefore, FDI is seen as a viable strategy by the current 
regime to obtain growth without adding further indebtedness, and this has been seen in 
the regime’s commitment in adopting macroeconomic stabilization. Hence, inward 
inflows of FDI increased from US$ 1million in 1991 to US$ 256.4 in 2005 in Uganda 
(IMF, 2006, and details are in appendix C).  
______________________ 
1UEPB (2004, p.9, 11& 12) 
2AfDB/OECD (2004, p.325-327) 
3World Development Indicators, April 2006. 
4Country analysis briefs at great lakes region country analysis brief.htm 
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3.2 Macroeconomic policy reforms:  
3.2.1 Fiscal policy  
This study takes an analytical approach to fiscal incentives in attracting FDI in Uganda. 
Tax holidays of 1991 were intended to attract foreign investors into the economy, and a 
similar reform was initiated in 1997. 
5 
The new fiscal reform tends to favor new firms 
more explicitly than under the gone tax holidays, in which losses may be carried forward 
indefinitely and depreciation allowances are generally favourable. However, tax holidays 
benefit long term committed investors, and Uganda’s inadequacy in resource 
fundamentals such as natural resources, large market size and growth means attracting 
mobile TNCs that tend to respond to market signals. 
 
Fiscal incentives are among the groups of factors that have positively lured FDI into 
Uganda’s economy, but are not the most important factors for attracting FDI. The Private 
Sector Survey of 2003 in Uganda has pointed out that fiscal incentives influence 
investment decisions by (51%), trailing behind other variables such as political stability 
(72%), domestic market size (65%), regional market (55%) and telecommunication 
(55%). 
6 
Hence, foreign investors in Uganda’s economy are attracted most due to political 
stability and economic fundamentals such market size and market growth.  
______________________ 
5Ritva (1999, p.5&7):Tax systems in Uganda; Initial allowances of 50-70% for 
investment in machinery and plants in the initial year, the abolition of tax holidays, 
20% of annual depreciation allowances to farms works instead of 4% under the 
previous arrangement. The company income tax is 30 % and firms are allowed to carry 
their operating losses indefinitely, except those granted tax holidays. The 1997 Income 
Tax Act stipulates the initial investment allowances and the annual depreciation 
allowances available to all taxable firms. It never granted initial allowances for 
industrial buildings and annual depreciation rate is much smaller to 5 % than that of 
machinery. 
6UBOS (2004, p.67) report on interviews of 46 % foreign and 54% domestic firms 
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 However, the role of fiscal incentives should not be undermined because Uganda is 
comparatively poor in terms of natural resource endowments, and it has not yet 
developed fully the basic microeconomic variables necessary to reap the full benefits of 
fiscal incentives. For example, SAI and Xpressions flowers’ firms have relocated to 
Ethiopia because it offers development funds, training and market research on top of 
land, long term loans with low interest rates, support grants, 10 years’ tax holidays, basic 
infrastructure and subsidized air freight charges to investors.
7
 At this point, critics have to 
acknowledge that fiscal incentives are necessary evils in Uganda’s economy because they 
reduce the cost of doing business.  
 
As noted earlier in the literature that fiscal incentives can lead to delays and corruption, 
findings from Uganda’s economy justify the above hypothesis. Foreign investors face 
delays and additional costs while determining their eligibility for fiscal incentives from 
UIA in order to avoid troubles with the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA). According to 
The World Bank Group 2006 data base, the number of procedures needed for starting a 
business remained at 17 since 2004, and number of days has been reduced from 36 in 
2004 to 30 in 2006. These procedures and days are higher when compared to 6.2 and 16 
in OECD respectively. Even the newly introduced VAT created more constraints on 
investors by 49.9% and income tax (42.8%), corporate tax by 37.8%. 
8
 The issue is not 
only about fiscal reform, but the conduct of business with regards to tax collection, 
whereby investors are considered as customers. If tax incentives are poorly implemented, 
management will be failing the already existing foreign investors. 
______________________ 
7The New Vision, Thursday 14th December, 2006 
8The New Vision; Sunday, 21st May 2006: report on Private Capital Survey 2005. 
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Fiscal incentives are effective and necessary, but what matters is the behavioral culture of 
the implementing authorities to exhibit acceptable behaviors. For Example, URA which 
administers tax concessions was reported in the 1998 Survey as the least popular agency 
in tax and custom administration, and is neither improving nor changing in some of its 
tax administration because of the excessive bureaucracy, high tax rates, delays in 
clearance of document and goods.
9
 With the recent power crisis in the economy, URA 
only managed to be displaced to second position from lists of agencies which negatively 
affect investment after UEDCL (22%) because of load shedding and URA (16%).
10  
Is it 
because URA is given too much power? No, power is needed for the efficient tax 
collection, but URA should be checked by the ombudsman that reports work abuses 
without any compromise because delays and corruption undermine country’s policy 
reform. 
 
Similarly, Uganda pursues a relatively tight fiscal policy to promote private sector 
development and avoids crowd out effects. The fiscal deficit was reduced from 4.5 per 
cent of the GDP in the fiscal year 2001/02 to 3.3 per cent of the GDP in the fiscal year 
2002/03, and tax revenue increased from 10.8 per cent of the GDP to 11.9 per cent of the 
GDP respectively. 
11 
This has crowded-in private opportunities in the economy. In fact, as 
a pro-Washington consensus, Uganda receives relatively an increased Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) to the buy tradables. 
 
_____________________________  
9Duanjie and Ritva (1999, p.12) 
10 AfBD/OECD (2004, p.57) 
11Basu & Srinivasan (2002, p.33) 
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Hence, stability is being registered at the macro level, which tends to take a long term 
approach to redress inequality in development. Moreover, the reduction in the fiscal 
expenditure has shown inadequate success in the social sector such as health and rural 
infrastructure. Even the private sector which is feared not be overcrowded does not 
adequately invest in these areas.     
 
3.2.2 Monetary policy  
The adoption of flexible exchange rate and the legalization of the black market in 1990 
were intended to stabilize the value of Ushs. Also, current and capital accounts were 
liberalized to facilitate free flows of capital. Bank of Uganda (BOU) was boosted to 
formulate and implement monetary policy independently through “Bank of Uganda Act 
of 1993”.12 Significantly, the annual inflation rate was caped below 5 percent.13 This led 
to the reduction of inflation rate from 7.5 per cent in 1996 to 2.5 per cent in 2002, and 
interest rate was reduced from 22% in 1996 to 17.5 % in 2002.
14
  
 
However, Uganda is a price taker at the international market and is pruned to drought. 
According to the Foreign Private Capital Survey 2005 report, foreign exchange was the 
biggest hindrance with 56.4% because of its volatility, followed by corruption (55.4%), 
interest rates (54.8) and power (39.8%). 
13 
Hence, foreign exchange is the most 
constraining factor in the survey of 2005 with corruption taking the second position. 
 
______________________ 
12Abdalla and Egesa (2005, p. 10 &11) 
13AfDB/OECD (2006, p.510) 
14UN (2004, p.13) 
15The New Vision; Sunday, 21st May 2006. 
 48 
Monetary policy has a little successful story in attracting FDI into Uganda’s economy, 
especially those dealing in financial services, capital assets and export oriented FDI 
which makes their products very expensive and not competitive in foreign markets.  
 
The initial success in controlling the exchange rate and inflation rate were due to 
increased ODA which reinforced the capacity of Uganda’s economy to buy tradables. 
High interest rates limit credit availability and growth to foreign investors which are 
needed for the capital investment. More so, the inadequate collateral of private investors 
make only big companies to access financial assistance, leaving out SMEs, even though 
they are needed for the development of viable private sector led economy.  
 
3.2.3 Trade policy  
Uganda has removed bans on imports and eliminated export taxes. 
16
 Bank of Uganda 
provides medium and long term financing to potential export oriented investors, and is 
supported by external donors’ agencies. These include Apex Private Sector Loan 
Schemes to SMEs, and Export Refinance Fund for working capital in non-traditional 
crops.
17  
 
___________________________ 
16MoFPED (2000, p.2) 
17Abdalla & Egesa (2005, p.12 &16) discuss numerous categories of exports and guarantee 
schemes; exports and imports were liberalized apart from agro-chemical and pharmaceutical that 
needed clearance from National Drug Authority. Manufacturers and exporters of goods and 
services have access to a duty draw back to enable them compete in foreign markets without 
undue hardship arising from costs of imported inputs into the final export price (exporters 
drawback up to 100%). Exporters in manufacturing have a bound scheme that allow them seek 
custom licenses to hold and use imported raw materials intended for manufacturing for exports 
in secured places without payment of taxes. 
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While Uganda has registered success in liberalizing its trade policy, there are weaknesses 
in institutional capacity with regards to effective implementation. There are 12 
documents needed when exporting and it takes 42 days while importing needs 19 
documents and it takes 67 days. 
18
 In addition, Uganda’s ranking in the 2006 Economic 
Freedom Index was very low compared to other FDI competitors in Africa. Uganda (60
th
) 
trailed behind some of the selected countries like Botswana (30
th
), and South Africa 
(50
th
). 
19
 This reflects the limited degree of freedom in conducting business by the private 
sector in the economy. Financial loans have been limited and benefited only big TNCs. 
They find it easier easy to get financial loans compared to domestic investors while at the 
same time incur high cost on transport, and delays in cross border trade when importing 
inputs, which can even be produced locally by SMEs if funding was at least given 
relatively to them. 
 
3.2.4 Political stability and transparency in the institutions: 
As a way to reduce political risks, the GOU have recognized the importance of 
democratic governance as a prerequisite for political stability. 
20 
This policy has 
positively affected inflows of FDI in the economy (political stability registered 72 % and 
availability of local market (65%), regional market and improvement in telecom had 55% 
respectively). 
21
 However, political factor alone is not a necessary condition for sustained 
inflows of FDI. Economy has to improve on other non-political factors such as 
infrastructural services which reduce the cost of utility.  
______________________  
18The WB Group 2006: Economy Rankings - Doing Business - sub Saharan africa.htm 
19The Heritage Foundation <Index of Economic Freedom 2006 – countries.htm 
20AfDB/OECD (2004, p.335) 
21UBOS (2004, p.67) based on the Private Sector Survey 2003 
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More so, the GOU has demonstrated commitment and political will by instituting the 
Leadership Code. The objective is to limit the incidence of corruption and promote public 
transparency, good conduct and leadership in public agencies. Uganda has got a good 
program in creating awareness on best regulatory practices. 
22 
Unfortunately, there is little 
or no value for money gained from this program. Creating awareness among foreign 
investors has got negligible impact on improving the locational advantage, even though it 
remains a viable option on enlightening foreign investors to resist illegal practices. 
UNIDO’s survey of 2003 was replicated in 2005 and the result has shown that investment 
perception has slightly worsened more than in the survey of 2003 in Uganda.
23
 Graft 
seems to be unchanging in hindering the operation of business. Uganda was ranked 93
rd
 
out of the 102 countries in the 2003 survey,
24
 and has featured to number 105 in the 
global corruption index ranking of 2006.
25
  The Private Sector Survey of 2005 ranked 
corruption as the second hindrance (55.4%) after foreign exchange volatility (56.4%).  
 
The act of corruption has become a public good whereby investors have to pay 
bureaucrats before accessing public utilities such as electricity, water, and 
telecommunications among others which preceded actual implementation of projects. 
This explains why Uganda has got low actual investment rates when compared to 
planned investment rates because corruption frustrates implementation of TNCs’ projects.  
______________________ 
22Klein (2004) compared 12 African countries by making analysis of public statements, 
institutions and actions. He rated at a maximum of 24 points.  Uganda leads with 20 
points beating Kenya that was rated at Kenya 18 points and Ghana 11 points. Others 
were Tanzania 8 points, Mozambique 8 points, south Africa 6 points, Botswana 4 
points, Lesotho and Malawi 3 points, Namibia, Swaziland and Zambia had 2 points. 
23UNIDO (2006, p.124) 
24World Bank (2004, p.41) 
25Transparency International.htm -Berlin, 10th July 2006 
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To prove that this is not based on intuition, The World Bank Survey (2000) disapproves 
the success of the Leadership Code, in which more than 80% of business firms reported 
paying bribes during a typical business year and the amount of bribes does not correlates 
with the favors offered in return: 
Most firms reported paying more bribes than on necessities 
such as security; 70 % on corporate tax, and 50% reported 
larger payment on bribes than total investment. Not paying 
bribes will continue to mean loss of business for smaller 
companies and big companies can resist such practices.  In 
a similar study, Ugandan firms typically have to pay bribes 
when dealing with public officials whose actions directly 
affect firm’s business operations. How much? The more a 
firm can, the more it has to pay.
28
 
 
In analysis, Ugandan small firms are affected most by graft than large firms which have 
got the power of neo-corporatism. This practice kills the economy because SMEs are 
needed for the development of absorptive capacity that later transfer employment to 
ordinary Ugandans, who can not easily be employed directly by the big TNCs because of 
low skills. By bureaucrats directly affecting firms’ business operations, means deterrence 
of ‘referred investors’ who respond positively to investment opportunities when tipped by 
the already existing investors. More so, it can be argued that, it is not firms paying 
bureaucrats, but ordinary Ugandans who are consumers bear the actual incidence because 
corruption is included in the factor of production, and firms shift the cost to consumers 
who bear the real burdens. 
 
Svensson further found that corruption has two adverse consequences: 1) discourages 
investment in sector S1 and shifts production to sector S2 and he called it “allocation 
effect”; 2) firms will tend to pick a more reversible (but possibly less efficient) capital 
stock, and he labeled it “technology effect.” 26  
 52 
These shifts are market failures caused by egoistic bureaucrats who reduce competition, 
which affects the welfare of citizens because prices become high as the supply of such 
commodities becomes volatile to bribes.  Even the adoption of less efficient technology is 
a market failure in facilitating technological transfers which the government has ever 
talked of through FDI 
 
3.3    The return of Asian investors:  
Amin’s government gave an ultimatum of 90 days to all Asians to leave Uganda. Yet 
Asians were active in trade and agricultural-based industries like sugar production by the 
early 1970s. Historically, Asians were Indians coolies who came to build the East African 
Railway at the turn of the early 20
th
 century, and they were about 25,000 to 70,000 strong 
communities at the time of independence in 1962. Most of them had British citizenship 
while a small number held Indian and Pakistani passports. Amin’s “economic war” was 
applied indiscriminately to all Asians irrespective of citizenship or economic 
contribution. United Kingdom took 300,000 of them, Canada 15,000 and some returned 
to south Asia. The Expropriated Properties Act of 1982 was passed by Obote’s regime to 
lure Asian investors back into the economy and this continued during Museveni’s regime, 
that actively wooed the Asians and about 5,000 Asians investors have already returned, 
others have reclaimed their assets, rehabilitated industries while some have started new 
investments. 
______________________ 
26Svensson (2002 1, 2 &41); he studied the causes and consequences of corruption in 
Uganda where he collected quantitative data on micro corruption on a cross- section of 
firms. His study was guided by a simple principal agent model and rested on the 
assumptions: 1) bureaucrats are profit maximizers; 2) existing firms can avoid bribes; 3) 
there are many bureaucrats, each being uncertain of remaining in a position to extract 
rents. 
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The Madhvani Group is among the Asians who have returned and controls significance 
enterprises like Kakira Sugar Works and Nile Breweries, and contributes to Government 
revenues at 80 billion Ugandan shillings per annum.
27
  
 
The return of Asian investors is a practical example of a demonstrated political will to 
attract Asian investors back into the economy, and build confidence in them that the 
Ugandan economic nationalism of 1972 has been shelved by the current leadership. As a 
result, Indians in the last five years have created 115 project investments worth Ushs 170 
billion plus 7,839 jobs. 
28
 They are currently actively involved in construction, 
agriculture, mining and the financial sector. Their expertise in wholesale and retail 
businesses has induced competition and prices have been driven down. 
 
3.4    The Privatization factor:  
Uganda implemented the privatization program due to the need to reduce fiscal burden, 
develop private sector, broaden ownership, increase economic efficiency, reduce 
administrative burden, and develop capital market.
29
 This was conducted through the 
Public Enterprise Reform and Divestiture Statue of 1993, in which 117 enterprises have 
been divested and 39 liquidated/strike-offs (appendix A provides some of the remaining 
public enterprises not yet privatized). The divestiture started with small enterprises and 
the focus is currently on utility and large scale sector.  
______________________ 
27UN (2004, p.17)  
28 The New Vision, Sunday, 19th November, 2006 based on the report by UIA’s executive 
director Dr. Maggie Kigozi. 
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The privatization program was successful since productive capacity of privatized 
enterprises has increased from 11% in 1993 to 51% in 1998. The pace of privatization 
process was faster in Uganda, and this facilitated rapid inflows of FDI in the economy. 
The divestiture has taken the form of direct sale of government shares, wholly or partly, 
in public enterprises, auction of debt/equity swap, joint ventures, and management 
contracts.
30
 Public Enterprise Reform and Divestiture was amended in 2000 to facilitate 
privatization process, embedded with the commitment and transparency under the new 
Privatization and Utility Sector Reform Project (PUSRP) which was effected from 31
st
 
January 2001.
31
  
______________________ 
29Campell and Bhita, 1996, p. 11 & 22 
Privatization means transfer of the operational control of an enterprise from the 
government to the private sector. The operational control to the private sector can be 
conducted through leases, concessions, or contract management. Controls are always 
secured through majority ownership. The definition includes equity dilutions -where 
the government has moved from a majority position to holding minority equity and 
Joint ventures – where a government holds no more than 50% of the equity and has 
ceded management to the private holders. 
Divestiture means any transaction by which the government has transferred title or 
sold some or all assets or shares in an enterprise. This includes sales of government 
held shares, transfers of shares or assets, public enterprise mergers, official 
liquidations or sales of assets through other means. Divestiture is a process to the 
privatization, but does not mean equity dilutions, joint ventures, leases, concessions, 
and management contract. Although government has ceded ownership controls under 
these methods (i.e. sold or parted with, or transferred title to). Transactions mean 
“deals” reached whether in privatization or step towards eventual privatization. 
Liquidation relates the closure and winding up of an incorporated enterprise in 
accordance with procedures under insolvency –full divestiture when the enterprise is 
wound up. Lease – in return for an agree fee (rent), a private operator is given the 
custody for a specific period of time of some or all of these assets of a public enterprise 
to employ them a in productive manner. Ownership of the assets remains with the 
enterprise, and the ownership of the shares remain unchanged – temporary 
privatization of the business takes place and lasts as long as the lease arrangement.  
Concession is a contractual arrangement whereby, in return for a negotiated fee, a selected 
private operator is awarded a license to provide specified services over a period of time. 
Ownership   of the principal assets remains with the enterprise, and ownership of shares 
remains unchanged – temporary privatization of the service takes place and lasts for as 
long as the concession lasts. Concession is awarded on a competitive tendering.  
30 
Basu and Srinivasan (2002, p.36) 
31
MoFPED (2003, p.1&2) 
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This study focused on how privatization process has positively influenced inflows of FDI 
in Uganda’s economy. For example, in November 1999 GOU and UEB executed 
contracts with AES Nile Power for the development of 200MW Bujagali private sector 
hydropower project worth US$ 500m.
32
 South African power Company, Eskom, was 
awarded 20 years concession to operate the Jinja stations in November 2002.
33 
Umeme 
Ltd in 2004 took the distribution role of power for a concession of 20 years. These 
arrangements improved on the management of power sector. However, there are other 
things government do better than the private sector, especially in the energy development 
which has got high sunk cost, long gestation periods, plus heavy capital investment in 
which the cost of power, if rendered by the private sector, becomes very expensive for 
citizens. 
 
The monopoly of Uganda Posts and Telecommunications Corporation was abolished. 
The Uganda Telecommunications Limited (UTL) was created to compete favorably with 
new foreign telecoms. These include MTN, Celtel, Mango, and the new Warid. MTN 
joined Ugandan market in 1998 and currently operates countrywide.
34
  
 
MTN has successfully created a “public good,” that is cell phones, which was 
characterized by market failures of coverage, imperfect competition and monopoly. This 
has built confidence in foreign investors because utility costs are driven down and 
businesses can be conducted smoothly.  
_______________________ 
32 MoFPED (2000, p.9) 
33 UN (2004, p.19) 
34 MoFPED (2000, p.14)  
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In the financial sector, Uganda Commercial Bank was privatized in 2002 and finally 
merged with the Stanbic Bank of South Africa. This contributed positively, especially in 
stabilizing the financial sector with multiple commercial banks spurring up the expansion 
of financial intermediation which increases confidence of foreign investors. The 
privatization program is the most important factor that facilitated inward FDI. Other 
cases include: Rwenzori Highland Tea Company Ltd bought by Finlays Group, British 
American Tobacco (BAT) sold to BAT, Blenders Uganda Ltd sold to Unilever, Kakira 
sugar works, Kibimba Rice Co. Ltd, Uganda Tea Corporation.
35   Details on Uganda’s 
privatization programs are in appendix B.  
 
3.5   The Creation of Uganda Investment Authority (UIA): 
The 1991 investment code resulted into the creation of UIA that handles process of 
investment proposals, giving assistance and advice to potential investors.
36
 UIA in 1999 
changed its role from general marketing to targeting of FDI into priority sectors such as 
horticulture, food processing, tourism, textiles, packaging, livestock, and mining, where 
Uganda has a competitive advantage.
37  
 Marketing strategies have been via direct mails 
to potential investors, use of both Ugandan embassies and consulates abroad and foreign 
embassies accredited to Uganda and other agencies as key avenues.  
______________________ 
35ibid9 p.9-10  
36 UNCTAD WID – Country Profile: Uganda Nov. 2006  
37UIA Annual Report (1999/2000, p.9), priorities countries were grouped into economic 
zones: Zone 1 constitutes South Africa, Kenya, and Mauritius. Zone 2 constitutes Egypt 
and the Gulf States. Zone 3 Constitutes United Kingdom and France. Zone 4 Constitutes 
India, China, USA and Italy. In Zones 1-3, UIA contracts International Investment 
Promotion Service providers to assist in targeting investors in the respective zone such as 
www.aaitpc.com supervised by UNIDO. UIA staff handles the investment promotion 
activities for countries in zones 4. 
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The Mission to India and Malaysia in April 2000 was for palm oil growing, milling and 
refining in preparation for the implementation of Oil Palm in Kalangala. 
38
 This mission 
yielded a positive outcome. BIDCO Company currently runs a palm oil plantation project 
in Kalangala district.  
 
In addition, UIA provides investment facilitation and “after care” by organizing meetings 
with investors to identify investors’ problems and handle investors on case by case basis 
at different levels of authorities, and liaisons with relevant line agencies and ministries to 
provide services to all prospective and already existing investors.  
 
After looking at the UIA as one of the means the GOU is supporting FDI as an alternative 
development paradigm, it is important to consider whether its role in promoting FDI has 
been adding value for money. A follow-up assessment of the UIA project activity 
concluded that $830 million was invested as a result of these components, amounting to $ 
1,000 for every $ 1 spent. A detailed analysis confirmed that investors’ projects are 
closely linked to the outward and inward missions. Up to 500 of 1800 existing investors 
contacted received “after care” through site visits.39 In addition; the BIDCO Palm oil 
project in Kalangala has been as a result of outward mission to Malaysia in 2000. More 
so, over 710 (about 20%) investment projects licensed since 1991 have taken off 
according the report by UIA.
40 
______________________ 
38 UIA Annual Report (1999/2000, p. 10, 11, 14, 16 & 17) 
39MIGA, 2004, p.53 
40The New Vision, Tuesday, 16th January 2007 
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In critical perspectives however, UIA has registered great impact on the promotional role 
and its performance has been evaluated by TNCs at above 85 % in line with their 
expectations in the UNIDO’s survey of 2003 (p.78). However, it has attracted more of 
‘quantity rather than quality’ of foreign investors competing for domestic market 
especially in the production of non tradables. The UIA has also done little in directing 
investments in order to spur regional development because the greatest percentage of 
investments is in the central region.   
 
In line with the above mentioned point, it is advisable for the UIA to focus currently on 
land as a factor of production, UIA has achieved less especially in securing land for 
commercial investment which can generate spillovers in the economy. Land in Uganda is 
leasehold land rather than freehold to foreign investors. 
41
 Hence, the role of UIA is still 
limited to stakeholders’ management on land issues. Land is really scarce to potential 
investors in Uganda because of the political economy involved in it. For example, 
BIDCO is a greenfield palm oil project in Kalangala district, approved by the GOU in 
2004 and started with $ 150m. The GOU is expected to provide 26,500 hectares of land, 
25 years corporate tax holidays and VAT deferral for plantation projects. Only 5,500 
hectares of land have been provided, and 3,500 hectares have been utilized for palm trees 
project. However, the project has got opposition from environmentalists and Members of 
Parliament because of the ecological consequences and fiscal losses.
42
  
_____________________________ 
41Games (2004, p.71): In addition, lists of lands available to foreign investors in Uganda 
are Sembabule (4.5 square miles) lease hold, Kiryangdongo (9 square miles) freehold, 
Masindi (20 square miles) lease hold, Kasangati (20 acres) lease hold, Pain Upe (1700 
square miles) untitled, Luzira (26 hectare miles) freehold, Nalumunye (137.5 hectares) 
mailo land, Pallisa (Un-surveyed), Bweyogere (35 acres) freehold (UIA Monthly Report for 
August 2004).  
42The New Vision, Sunday, 24th September 2006 
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The Sugar Corporation of Uganda (SCOUL) has got land problem. SCOUL needs about 
7,100 hectares of land for increasing the production of sugar in order to meet the national 
target. SCOUL also pays annually about Ushs13.3billion in taxes, employs 6,760 people, 
in addition to 1,000 out growers. 
43
 In Northern Uganda, the political risk is high for 
foreign investors because of continuous pronouncements of economic nationalism by 
area representatives: 
I will spear to death any investor who dares to step in my 
constituency, I am warning the minister that we shall spear 
any investor who claims to be investing in our land or any 
body who dares to plough it because land is the only asset 
we are left with, said Aruu representative.
44
 If the 
government tries to take our land, there will be more 
atrocities than those committed by the LRA rebels, said 
Acholi Parliamentary Group Chief.
45 
 
These complicate the role of UIA which liaison between potential investors and land 
owners. Its role is constrained by the political economy in areas that are cynical of the 
land question, seeing government’s efforts to acquire land for commercial investment as 
‘state alliance of neo-corporatism’ to grab their land in the name of promoting 
development. Land has become a public good for politicians in Northern Uganda. It is 
supposed to be preserved for future generations and this necessitates its capitalization in 
the quest for a political alternative. People in Northern Uganda have low awareness on 
how they can benefit from foreign investors and UIA has also done little in creating 
awareness to an average communal person in the North.  Hence, the issue is whether UIA 
decentralizes its land role and the local finalizes deals on land arrangements with the 
potential investors who shall be renting from the local community rather than being sold? 
_____________________________ 
43The New Vision, Monday 16th October 2006: Metha wants 7,100 Hectares. 
44The New Vision, Thursday, 16th November 2006: Otto warns investors  
45The New Vision, Friday, 17th November 2006: Acholi MPs warned on land statements 
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3.6 The Medium Term Competitive Strategy (MTCS): 
MTCS is a multi-sectoral government program which aims at improving the private 
sector competitiveness by increasing investment in basic infrastructure and improving 
institutional capacity of various ministries and line agencies. 
46
 It is based on the 
philosophy that strong economic growth would eradicate poverty, given the high level of 
private sector investment. However, the actual experience from relating findings shows 
that achieving MTCS is far from an easy task. The Private Investment Survey of 1998 
revealed that on average, firms lose an estimated $90m of operating days a year due to 
power cut, which later translates into high cost of production. This therefore, reduces the 
competitiveness of private firms in Uganda, even though, 77 percent of large firms, 44 
percent of medium-size firms, and 16 percent of small firms own power generators.
47    
 
The impact of MTCS is insufficient in attracting the heavy manufacturing FDI because 
existing TNCs operate below capacity. It was not surprising when the hydro electricity 
capacity of 380 mega watts on River Nile reduced in the financial year 2005/06 to 135 
MW because of the extended regional drought. 
48
 Amidst power shortages, Electricity 
Regulatory Authority has approved new tariffs increment that took place on 1
st
 November 
2006 to 41% and 55% for commercial and large scale industries respectively. Hence, 
Uganda Manufacturers Association (UMA) boss had to respond to such policy: 
 
 
______________________ 
46UEPB (2004, p.7): Annual Report  
47MoFPED (2000, p.3): Medium Term Competitive Strategy for Private Sector 2000-005) 
48The New Vision, Thursday, 4th May 2006:  
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The power tariff hike slapped on the industry, which is 
already overburdened with high production costs, is 
devastating. Many of the industries will close or relocate 
to the nearby countries
49
 
 
Hiking the power tariff adds cost of doing business in Uganda. Heavy industry 
automatically reduces production and this affects consumption level in the economy. 
More so, prospective investors are deterred from entering Uganda’s economy due to the 
high cost of utility. Especially, footloose industries relocate to other countries because 
they (foreign investors) tend to be more responsive to policy environment. 
 
Being a landlocked country (Uganda), transport is expensive to manufacturing firms and 
its infrastructure suffers from negligence and poor management.
50
 It is 1,200 km through 
the northern corridor to the port of Mombassa, in Kenya, or 1,600km through the central 
corridor to the port of Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania. High transport costs are estimated at 
about 35 percent of the total value of exports.
51
 The transport cost of raw material from 
Mombassa had gone up by more than 50 per cent, and the rail cost of 20ft container in 
November 2004 was US$ 1600, while in September 2006 rated at +$2500 and road 
transport has gone up from US$ 2400 to US$ 3500 per 20 fit FCL. It takes less than 12 
days to 30 days by rail and there are no return journeys of the export trucks.
52
  
 
_____________________________ 
49The New Vision, Wednesday, 1st November 2006: Industries risk closer over high 
power tariffs 
50AfDB/OECD (2006, p.513): African Economic Outlook. Paris 
51Games (2004, p.70): The experience of South African firms in doing business in Africa. 
A preliminary survey and analysis  
52PSF (2005, p.1):  Cost of Doing Business in Uganda. Policy Advocacy Unit 2005 
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To export oriented foreign investors, MTCS has not yet made any differences and this 
explains why Uganda’s economy has more domestic market-oriented FDI than 
regionally-oriented FDI which could generate significant impact in the economy. More 
so, even those already operating in the economy do not compete comparatively because 
of high cost of transport and the trends are changing towards merchandise businesses 
than in key production areas.   
 
3.7 The “Big Push” Strategy 
 The Big Push Strategy aims to promote competition, improve efficiency, spur 
innovation, encourage inter-firm learning, establish forward and backward linkages in 
production, and subsequently improves quality for firms to become competitive.
53
 It 
came to exist after the 1998 joint analysis by the GOU, UNCTAD and UNDP; where 
fundamental decisions were reached to embark on the major push for investment 
promotion.
54
 Sectors selected included: agriculture/cotton, banking and insurance, air 
cargo and inland port, education, Multi-Facility Economic Zones (MFEZ), 
information/communication technology, medical facilities and printing and publishing.  
This resulted into the creation of EPZs and Free Trade Zones in Entebbe. In addition, 
GOU is working on New Industrial Park at Namanve and Luzira .
55  
 
 
_______________________ 
53 United Nations (2004, P.11): An Investment Guide to Uganda Opportunities and 
conditions, New York. 
54UIA Annual Report (1999/2000, p.15) 
55UIA News Letters April-June 2006 Quarterly reports  
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However, this program is just at an initial phase, involving planning and site construction. 
It has got little impact in attracting export oriented FDI that would generate exports, 
increase employment and facilitate domestic linkages, instead it has attracted FDI only in 
construction especially those from South Africa. Hence, the government’s effort in 
promoting FDI through Multi-facility Economic Zones is far from its realization.  
 
3.8 Regional Initiatives:  
Uganda is a member of East Africa Community (EAC), African Union, NEPAD and 
COMESA. It is also a member of African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries partnership, 
Cotonou agreement for the renegotiation of the preferential trade and aid links with the 
EU and is eligible for “EU Everything But Arms initiative” and the “United State’s 
market access initiative” for sub-Saharan Africa (AGOA). It is a member of the WTO 
and is a signatory to the International Center for the settlement of Investment Disputes 
and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.
56
 EAC is a custom union that would lead 
Common External Tariffs on imported goods. 
57
 It is moving along the continuum from 
custom union to full economic integration.
58
 
______________________ 
56UNCTAD WID – Country Profile: Uganda Nov. 2006   
57 United Nations (2005 p.513): An Investment Guide to the EAC: opportunities and 
conditions. New York  
The EAC member countries are Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda as per the protocol for the 
establishment in March 2004 and effected from 1st Jan. 2005. Burundi and Rwanda 
joined later in 2006. The member countries of COMESA Include Angola, Burundi, 
Comoros, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe    
58 The Implementation of the customs Union Protocol in January 2005; creation of a single 
regional air space in August 2005; setting up of a regional Capital Markets Authority in 
December 2005; setting up of a Common Market in December 2007; adaptation of a single 
regional currency in September 2009; swearing-in of the President of a transitional 
Federation of East Africa in January 2010; drawing up of regional constituencies and 
swearing-in of a transitional Federation Parliament in 2010-2012; and Elections for an 
East African President and Government in March 2013 (United Nations, 2004,  p.9) 
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The regional and international market access has had positive effect on location of FDI in 
Uganda, that is, 39 per cent on foreign investors and 33 per cent on domestic investors.
59
 
This is an important opportunity for Uganda to justify the promotional role to attract 
regionally oriented FDI in order to reduce its expenses on transport cost in accessing 
markets in the EU and other western countries. 
 
In the project of AGOA, GOU pays up to Ushs 800m per year for its operations. These 
include: transport, training of girls, office rent, officer’s allowances, travels, and fuel and 
vehicle maintenance. Apparels Tri-Star is the Uganda’s company exporting garments to 
the US market under the project of AGOA since Dec. 2000.
 60 
 
 
The case of AGOA is almost the new strategy of financial subsidies GOU has started 
offering to the Apparels Tri-Star company. Legislatures disagreed with the GOU on this 
position because GOU is going too far with the allocation of money to private 
proprietors. However, strategically, GOU is right to offer financial assistance. The project 
has good impact on the economy, employing unemployed young girls countrywide, by 
exporting textiles to the USA means linkages with rural farmers in cotton production. 
Hence, the problem of financial management was at the company’s level, not the 
responsibility of the Government of Uganda.   
 
 
 
____________________  
59UBOS (2004, p.53): Private Sector Investment and Investment Perception in Uganda 
Report 2003  
60The New Vision: Friday 3rd November 2006: Now MPs want TriStar’s Kananathan 
arrested 
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3.9 Comparisons of constraints on foreign and domestic 
manufacturing firms 
Can we say that foreign investors are doing better because they are foreigners and have 
special offers compared to domestic investors? The response is no, they bear more 
burdens than domestic firms in Uganda as illustrated in table one below.  
Table 1: The percentage of respondents evaluating constraints as  major or very severe.
61
 
Constraint  Full 
sample  
Foreign 
firms  
Domestic 
firms 
Exporters  Non-
exporters  
Cost of finance (interest rate)  60.3 54.1 62.0 62.5 60.2 
Tax rates 48.3 43.3 49.6 48.9 48.4 
Macroeconomic instability  45.4 57.6 41.3 64.3 41.7 
Access to finance (collateral 
requirements) 
45.0 36.5 47.7 37.2 46.6 
Electricity  44.5 48.5 43.1 52.4 42.9 
Corruption  38.2 55.0 33.3 56.4 35.0 
Tax administration  36.1 42.2 34.5 42.9 35.1 
Anticompetitive or informal practices  31.1 34.4 30.2 41.5 29.4 
Skills and education of available 
workers 
30.8 25.4 32.0 36.6 30.0 
Regulatory policy uncertainty  27.6 38.1 23.7 42.9 24.6 
Custom and trade regulations  27.4 38.1 23.2 33.3 26.3 
Crime, theft, and disorder 26.9 37.3 23.5 36.4 25.3 
Transport  22.9 28.8 20.9 36.4 20.2 
Access to land  17.4 24.6 15.6 17.1 17.4 
Labor regulations 10.8 12.3 10.4 14.6 10.1 
Business licensing and operating 
permits  
10.1 13.4 9.2 8.9 10.4 
Telecommunications  5.2 6.2 4.9 7.0 4.5 
*Differences of more than 10% between different categories are bolded   
Source: World Bank Investment Climate for Uganda 2004 report p.38 
 
Foreign firms bear more burdens due to macroeconomic instability, corruption, 
regulatory uncertainty, custom and trade regulations and crime, theft and disorder by 
margins of 10 per cent. The macroeconomic instability burden reflects the dominant role 
of FDI in financial services which are affected by unstable value of Ushs against foreign 
currencies. Uganda is a price taker at the international level and is affected by changes in 
world oil prices, in addition to drought that has destabilized the economy.  
_____________________________ 
61 The World Bank 2002/03 survey was conducted to 392 firms in Uganda  
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Local firms are mainly dominant SMEs in agriculture, whole sales, and construction and 
services, hence, scoring low in the comparison. Corruption is high among foreign firms 
because they are foreigners, financially loaded, and they have low level of awareness 
business procedures when accessing public utilities. They become the prime target of 
bureaucrats unless they want to receive the utility of ‘come tomorrow’ which is tactical. 
Customs and trade regulations having severe constraints on foreign investors reflect the 
traditional dominant role of FDI in the economy in production of raw materials to supply 
their home countries. The existence of regional export oriented FDI, long procedures and 
number of days for importers and exporters, and also reflect the high number of TNCs in 
Uganda which outsourced inputs from outside the economy.    
 
However, foreign investors have fewer constraints in accessing finance compared to local 
investors. This reflects the big size of TNC investments in the economy, which makes it 
easier for banks to grant foreign investors loans compared to local investors which have 
small size investment, making interest rates on borrowed loans very high because of high 
risk of paying back. Exporters face high degree of constraints on macroeconomic 
instability, corruption, informal practices, regulatory policy uncertainty, transport and 
crime, theft and disorder by margins of 10 per cent compared to the non-exporters. 
Ugandan products become expensive at the international market because inflation pushes 
up prices of factor of production. Corruption is high during the clearance to avoid delays, 
while informal practices such as smugglings reduce firms’ revenues and competitiveness 
due to the availability of cheap good and services.   Transport cost is high to the sea while 
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non-exporters only concentrate on the domestic market, thus reducing their degree of 
exposure to such practices.  
 
To sum up this chapter, the Government of Uganda has employed various macro policies 
to support FDI in the economy, including fiscal incentives, liberalized both exchange and 
capital markets, privatized most of its public enterprises, created promotional agency and 
recalled back the economic engineers chased during Amin’s regime. Uganda is currently 
moving towards micro policies to reduce the cost of doing business. These can be seen in 
the adoption of MTCS and the Big Push strategy. 
 
Fiscal incentives positively affect FDI location decisions in Uganda, but are not the most 
important factors compared to political stability and economic fundamentals such as 
domestic market and regional market. The provision of fiscal incentives by state 
authorities adds delays and costs to firms due to the ineffectiveness in administering, and 
has given bureaucrats the opportunity to do corruption.  
  
 The monetary policy has performed poorly in Uganda’s economy. The exchange rate 
volatility and high interest rates negatively affect FDI when it comes to capital loans. 
Uganda has liberalized trade, but non-tariff barriers remain active in frustrating foreign 
investors in the export sector. Uganda’s role in building transparent business operations, 
which is free from corruption, has remained unchanged in spite the adequate awareness. 
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The privatization program has positively affected inflows of FDI. The productivity of 
privatized enterprises has increased by a difference of 40 percent (an increment from 
11% in 1991 to 51% in 1998). Any discussion beyond this role is exogenous to the thesis 
argument. Calling back historical investors into the economy has been one of the 
significant reforms. Asians have rehabilitated their former enterprises which were 
nationalized and others have opened new ones. 
 
The role of UIA has been very effective in general marketing to attract FDI, but not much 
in targeting specific types of FDI which could turn around the economy and in managing 
land owners who leased land to foreign investors. Uganda’s economy has stagnated for 
the last 9 years with no improvement in terms of attracting FDI. Uganda was ranked in 
the 11
th
 position in 1998 in terms of attracting FDI (UNCTAD, 1999, p.49) in Africa. The 
recent ranking by the World Bank 2006 is still in the 11
th
 position. The FDI tends to 
respond to economic fundamentals (natural resources and market size and growth) more 
than the general improvement in policy (fiscal incentives, political stability, and good 
regulation).  
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CHAPTER FOUR   
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
ENTERPRISES IN UGANDA’S ECONOMY 
 
4.1   Introduction:  
This section discusses the basic characteristics of FDI enterprises in Uganda’s economy. 
It looks at the sectoral orientation of FDI enterprises, the country of origin, entry mode 
choices, and the regional distribution of FDI enterprises. Emphasis is taken in relating 
characteristics to the need of the host economy. Bank of Uganda defined FDI as 
reflecting the objective of a lasting interest by a resident entity in one economy (direct 
investor) in an entity resident in another economy (direct entity). FDI comprises of three 
components: new equity investment, re-invested earnings and inter-company loans.
1 
FDI 
flows to Uganda’s economy increased from US$1 million in 1991 to US$ 258.5 million 
in 2005. Equity investment increased from US$1 million in 1991 to US$155.9 in 2005 
(details in appendix C). These are due to changes in national policies such as 
privatization via M&As, and purchases of the existing projects which later helped in 
restoring the economy at the macro level, especially in agriculture, mineral, finance and 
real estate development.  
 
FDI enterprises have reinvested their earnings in Uganda. Reinvestment in earnings 
increased from US$5.0 million in 1993 to US$70.7million in 2005. This is a good-
practiced issue emerging from FDI because of re-investment in new projects within the 
host economy, which is a precondition for achieving economic development and building 
linkages within the economy. On top of this, reinvested earnings in the host economy is a 
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way of paying back to the economy because of its multiplier effects compared to profit 
repatriations and transfer pricing. Reinvesting in earnings also builds the national 
confidence in the performance of foreign firms which would act as an incentive for policy 
reform on equal treatment with local enterprises. However, reinvesting in earnings does 
not automatically mean benefits to the host economy unless it is in line with its economic 
interests and development strategy, and directed to sector of national priorities other than 
only in corporatists’ interests.  
 
As often emphasized, FDI can deepen the absorptive capability of SMEs by assisting 
them through financial obligations. Uganda’s economy has got good examples in which 
inter-company loans transfer increased from US$22.1 million in 1997 to US$31.8 in 
2005. Inter-company loans are given to local affiliates, but more financial loans should be 
given to local suppliers of inputs plus local distributors of TNC products. This can 
alternatively be a development point, where good local entrepreneurs are able to access 
real financing from financial intermediaries.  
 
4.2   Sectoral Orientation of FDI Enterprises: 
A survey by UBOS in 2003 shows that foreign enterprises’ activities in Uganda are 
concentrated mainly in manufacturing (29.1 per cent), wholesales and catering and 
accommodation (20.6 per cent), and finance services (16.8 per cent).  
 
 
_______________________ 
1UNCTAD WID – Country Profile: Uganda p.4 Nov. 2006 
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Table 2: The principal private enterprises’ activities in Uganda.2  
Sector  Domestic  Foreign  Total  
No  % No % No % 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 42 10.2 30 8.5 72 9.4 
Mining and quarrying  1 0.2 5 1.4 6 0.8 
Manufacturing  135 32.9 103 29.1 238 31.1 
Electricity, Gas and water 4 1.0 3 0.9 7 0.9 
Construction 15 3.7 26 7.3 41 5.4 
Wholesale/retail, catering/accommodation  88 21.5 73 20.6 161 21.5 
Transport, storage and communication 31 7.6 24 6.8 55 7.2 
Financing/insurance, real estate/services  49 12.0 58 16.8 107 14.0 
Community, social and personal services  14 3.3 10 2.8 24 3.1 
Activities not covered in the above  31 7.6 23 6.5 54 7.1 
Total  410 100.0 355 100.0 765 100.0 
   Source: Private Sector investment and Investment Perception in Uganda report 2003, published by UBOS 
2004, p.16 
 
The recent growth in manufacturing, wholesale, catering and accommodation plus 
finance sector shows investment opportunities in the economy because Uganda mainly 
depends on traditional crops (coffee, tea, cotton and tobacco) mostly from European 
investors. Manufacturing sector is the highest because of the new strategic market 
available in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi as well as 
the new market in Southern Sudan where the factor of production had been non-
operational for the last two decades due to wars. Also, when we look at the data from the 
manufacturing sector and finance, both foreign investors and private domestic investors 
have high levels of involvement. By implication, these necessitate opportunities for 
forward and backward linkages, learning from foreign affiliates’ technology and 
management skills, and even setting up research and development center for product 
development and innovation, which will enhance products’ quality and competitiveness 
on top of deepening the absorptive capacity of the economy.  
 
______________________ 
2UBOS (2004) reports on the surveyed 765 investing enterprises in Uganda in 2003  
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To illustrate further, the financial sector leads in the actual investment with an investment 
of US$339.7 (23.5%), followed by manufacturing US$335.3 (23.2%), electricity 
US$20.6 (1.4%) and mining is the least with US$6.2 (0.4%). 
3 
In the financial and real 
estate services, privatization program has opened entry into the economy to rescue the 
ailing companies which were controlled by the government through M&As and Joint 
Ventures. More so, Uganda has inadequate, poor financial and real estate developers 
prompting foreign investors to exploit lucrative opportunities. Furthermore, the trend 
towards services is not sensitive to distance, and it is needed for the economic integration. 
 
Uganda is experiencing high growth of FDI in financial services and real estate 
development, but manufacturing sector continues to dominate. It deems fit for the 
government to reinforce the recent development in services. These are non-tradables 
meant for domestic demands. Deepening the key productivity using the ‘best-practiced 
policy’ of targeted subsidy to promote production oriented firms in a particular industry 
is needed on top of relying on the general subsidy which has got little incidence, by 
attracting FDI in non-tradables. 
 
Investors’ participation in utility sector has been minimal since the 1990s. Private 
investments in energy increased from US$18 million in 2003 to US$124 million in 2005, 
and investment in telecom increased from US$4 million in 1994 to US$77 million in 
2005. Hence, totaling to 10 projects; 5 in electricity, telecom 3, water and sewage 2.
4 
___________________________ 
3UBOS (2004, p.22): Private Sector Investment and Investment Perception in Uganda 
Report 2003  
4The World Bank Group 2006: Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects Database 
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However, investment in the energy sector should not only be seen as a response to the 
current drought in the economy which has reduced the power production capacity of the 
Owen Falls Dam, but should be seen as a strategic point of entry into the economy given 
the available resources for energy development including solar, biomass, and Fall sites. 
Such best-practiced policy would be to the interest of the GOU that is eagerly promoting 
the rural electrification, but it is constrained by limited resources. Private developers can 
complement government’s production rather than being only consumers of energy.  
Foreign investors have recently invested in the energy sector to avoid load shedding 
which affects firms’ productivity and competitiveness. The recent development in 
telecom is due to the liberalization and removal of antitrust law that inhibits new entrants 
in the sector because of the agreement signed between MTN and Uganda Telecom in 
1998. This has helped in creating a public good (information and communication) across 
the country, unlike before under the monopoly of Uganda Post and Telecommunication 
Limited, which had been characterized by limited coverage, and lack of competition.  
 
4.3 Country of Origin of FDI Enterprises in Uganda:  
United Kingdom invests in Uganda more than any other country with a total of 287 
licensed projects; U.S.A came second with 50 licensed projects (high capital value of 
investment), Kenya in the third position with a total of 219 licensed projects. Others 
countries are Canada with 82 licensed projects, South Africa had 31 projects, India had 
178 projects, Egypt had 11 projects, Japan had 34 projects, Norway had 1 project, and 
Singapore had 5 projects. 
5  
________________________________  
5United Nations (2004, p.15) listed the top ten investing countries in Uganda covering 
the period between 1999 -2002. 
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European investors are mainly found in agriculture, basic chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
nonmetallic mineral products and financial intermediation, and they are absent in the 
wearing- apparel sector. African investors are strongly present in textile, wearing apparel, 
metallic products and manufacturing sector. Asian investors are particularly strong in 
wearing-apparel sector.
6
 Uganda is mostly dominated by the small, recently established 
foreign enterprises from the south with a strong concentration in the service sector having 
the highest density.
7
 
 
Europeans’ dominancy in the agricultural sector has a lot of implications. One is due to 
the need for raw materials in home countries, which is cognizant with the locational 
advantage theory.  Secondly, the market access granted under the “Everything But Arms” 
in the European Union and AGOA reflects the behavior of legislatures in opening up 
markets for their investors operating overseas as the primary objective, serving the 
interests of organized corporatism. This is because access is made for goods which are 
not produced in home countries and mostly intermediate agricultural inputs instead of 
manufactured products.  Their roles in chemicals and pharmaceuticals reflect the high 
expertise and capitals that are needed, and African investors have limited access to 
capitals. Therefore, Uganda can even improve on by attracting FDI from the South rather 
relying only on Northern investors. 
 
______________________  
6 UNIDO (2003, p.13): African Investment Survey: Motivations, operations and future; 
Implications for investment promotion, Vienna. 
7 UNIDO (2006, p.20): African Investment Survey 2005; Understanding the 
contributions of different categories to development implications for targeting strategies, 
Vienna.  
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Their concentration in textiles, apparel, metal products and manufacturing sector relieves 
the economy of transport costs, reinforces backward linkages with local entrepreneurs, 
diversifying export development necessary for economic integration, plus creating more 
jobs in more dynamic sense rather than in a static sense that is evident in agriculture 
products. 
 
This concurs with the view presented in UNCTAD (1994, p.33), that South Africa has a 
critical success factor for the investment pole in Sub-Saharan Africa. Cases from Uganda 
justify the proposition. UIA has a joint venture with South African companies including 
JHI Real Estate, iProp, engineering Companies BKS Global and ADS developers at 
Kampala Industrial in the construction of Business Park at Namanve.
8
 South Africa 
invested $17 million in Uganda and has become among the top ten countries in Uganda, 
established 32 companies mainly in tourism, mining, energy, construction, agriculture, 
trade, and services. Its total planned of investment in Uganda has reached US$222.79, 
and has created 3, 583 jobs. Fifteen Companies are wholly foreign to Uganda, while 17 
are Joint Ventures. South Africa dominates in the infrastructure sector in Uganda. For 
examples, Umeme and Eskom are in the power sector and MTN in telecom. MTN is the 
most powerful investment which begun in 1998 and holds 67% of the Mobile and 57% of 
the overall telecommunication markets including 207,000 lines in the 34 districts.
9 
In fact, 
Uganda has benefited from the commitment of South African investors in the provision 
of “public goods” especially utility services which European investors have neglected.  
______________________  
8Games (2004, p.17, 66, 68&69): The Experience of South African firms in doing 
business in Africa, The South African Institute of International Affairs.  
9The New Vision, 3rd May, 2006: South Africa companies dominate infrastructure sector 
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This has helped the economy in reducing utility costs, improved productivity, 
employment and leapfrogging technology of cellular phones, affordable by an average 
Ugandans. More so, many telephone outlets are operating countryside and local 
entrepreneurs act as agents to MTN showing the good-practiced policy. 
 
 
4.4   Entry Mode Choices:  
 
As noted earlier in the literature, FDI enters into the host economy through greenfield, 
M&As and joint ventures. UNIDO’s survey of 2003 found out that Joint Venture 
enterprises are 20%, new greenfiled enterprises are 67% and M&As are 13 %.
10
 
Similarly, the Private Sector Survey report 2003 shows that 521 enterprises (68.1%) in 
Uganda are greenfield investments, 81 (10.6%) are due the expansion of existing 
projects, 31 (4.1%) are purchased through privatization and 49 (6.4) are purchased of 
existing project, 53 (6.9%) are others and 30 (3.9%) are not indicated.
11
  
 
Uganda receives high number of FDI in greenfield as stated in the 2 surveys, and these 
have positive implications in the economy in terms of adding investment capital, offering 
new technology, introducing innovation management and linkages with the economy. 
However, high number of greenfield investments does not guarantee high employment 
and values added unless the government has high bargaining powers in inducing the 
behavioral and corporate strategy of TNCs in supporting linkages with domestic 
investors.  
______________________________ 
10UNIDO (2003, p.32) 
11UBOS (2004, p.17) 
12The New Vision: Wednesday 15th November, 2006 
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For example, BIDCO is a greenfield in palm oil project in Kalangala district. It currently 
employs 1,500 people who work for eight hours a day for 2000 Ushs (appro.US$1).
12 
However, this kind of greenfield increases the quantity of employment, but not the 
quality because of the poor working environment which is characterized by exploitation 
of rural people. How can someone work (physical work) for eight hours at a rate Ushs 
2000 (approximately US$1)? This has got nothing to do with employment apart from 
giving free labor to foreign investors because the government wants to show people that 
they are creating employment. Such kind of employment is just subsidizing foreign 
investors by the poor on top tax concessions granted to foreign investors.  
 
Uganda has registered significance numbers of Cross-Border M&As through sales and 
purchases of public enterprises between 1996 and up to date. Entry through sales worth 
US$55.4 million in 1996, 29 million  in 1997, 11 million in 1998 and 32 million in 2000. 
Entry through Purchases was registered in 1999 worth US$ 406.1 million.
13 
Among the 
largest M&As in the industrial section include Uganda Breweries from Kenya employing 
16,000, Nile Breweries from UK employing 634, BAT from UK employing 600, Uganda 
Grain Milling from Kenya employing 500, Hima Cement from France employing 350, 
monitor publications from Kenya employing 300, Unilever Uganda from UK employing 
160. In the finance sector include: Standard Chartered Bank Uganda from South Africa 
employing 113, Stanbic Bank Uganda Limited from South Africa employing 99, 
Barclays Bank of Uganda from UK employing 146, Bank of Baroda India employs 180, 
and  DFCU from Germany employing 95.
14 
______________________________ 
13UNCTAD (2002, p.106) 
14ibid1 p.13  
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In fact, the philosophy beyond M&As in Uganda was facilitated by privatization, 
globalization, and regional blocks for the strategic oriented investors. For example, 
industries such as Hima Cement, Nile Breweries, Stanbic Bank among others have 
improved on their performance. However, as noted earlier in the literature that M&As are 
undesirable if they are accompanied by rationalization. The case of “Nile Breweries” 
laying off 28 permanent employees as part of the second internal restructuring is part of 
the bad practices.
15 
It followed the laying off 15 staff by the “Uganda Breweries” to cut 
the cost of doing business. However, given the fact that restructuring is inevitable, Nile 
Breweries had the best practiced policy in which the first restructuring staff laid off 
underwent training in entrepreneurship. This however, mostly depends on the motivation 
of TNCs towards training of employees, and not all TNCs do it. 
   
For joint ventures, as pointed out earlier in the literature, are driven by the need for 
technical knowledge, raise finance, utilize local knowledge of bureaucracy and alleviate 
risks. Madhvani has a joint venture in Nile Independent Power Consortium with the 
initial investment plans of $400m. Also, Arabian International Construction Ltd., wholly 
owned by Egyptians has got $600 million in the “Kalangala Falls project”.16 Madhvani 
Group Crown Corks has entered a 50/50 joint venture with Coleus Packaging of South 
Africa to become the biggest Corks Company in the region. 
17 “
Made In Africa 
Exploration” has a joint venture with “Kilembe Mines Limited” worth US$20 million.18  
 
_______________________________ 
15Daily monitor Wednesday, May 3, 2006 
16 (UNCTAD, 2000a, p.5&7) 
17The New Vision, Wednesday, 25th October, 2005 
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As for the above scenarios, joint ventures in energy and mineral exploration can be 
regarded as positive moves in Uganda because they are meant to reduce risks and costs in 
the energy sector, acquire technology and managerial skills, local partnership and 
entrepreneurial class within local firms. This reinforces the capacity to produce additional 
power needed for the production process. However, the limited entry in the utility sector 
shows risks borne by the private sector’s participation in energy, including risks in heavy 
capital investment and sunk costs, government caps on prices and the political economy 
embedded in it.   
 
The 50/50 joint venture between the Madhvani Group and Coleus Packaging of South 
Africa to become the biggest Corks Company in the economy is a bad-practiced issue 
emerging from FDI. This is an oligopolistic reaction meant to reduce competition which 
is associated with market failure. Similarly, the recent development in the financial sector 
is worst from the host’s perspective because of it is more of the corporate governance and 
ownership. For example, Crane Bank has taken over Stanhope and Nile Bank, and Allied 
Bank International buyout by Bank of Africa-Kenya, AUREOS East Africa Fund LLC 
and Central Holdings. This reduces the development of financial intermediaries that 
would drive interest rates down, which in turn increase credit accessibility to SMEs that 
would steer a dynamic economy.   
 
 
______________________ 
18Daily Monitor, Saturday 6th May 2006 
 
 80 
4.5 Regional Distribution of FDI Enterprises:  
The distribution of FDI enterprises has economic impact in the host economy. Table 3 
below illustrates the regional distribution of FDI enterprises in Uganda.  
 
Table 3: Distribution of enterprises by region, actual investment and employment  
Region  Location of number of enterprises  Actual investment  Actual employment  
Domestic  Foreign  Total  %  Amount US $ m %  Number  % 
Central  281 315 596 77.7 1,032.8 71.4 61,890 73.8 
East  63 31 94 12.5 272.2 18.8 12,601 15.0 
West   57 8 65 8.5 136.0 9.4 8,836 10.5 
North  9 1 10 1.3 5.1 0.4% 570 0.7 
Total  410 355 765 100.0 1,446.1 100.0  100.0 
Source: Private Sector Investment Survey Report 2003 published by UBOS 2004, p.14 
 
 
Actual investments are concentrated in the central region (71.4%) as illustrated in table 3 
above. The rest of the regions have got little investments even though government 
invested in regions before liberalization. These scenarios have implications on economy 
in terms of regional imbalances because the government uses corporatist strategy in 
resource allocations to improve on utility and infrastructural services where foreign 
investors dominate in order to beat off competition from its counterparts. The central 
location and heavy investment of FDI enterprises are pull factors, which negatively 
affects the long term development planning proposed in PEAP framework, which 
provides for the private sector’s participation in poverty reduction strategies of increasing 
household incomes. For instance, 73.8 % of enterprise employment in the central region 
means a lot in terms of improving income poverty, and also, high possibility of being 
employed than the 0.7 percent in the North. More so, these regions with less investments 
are supply points for industrial inputs in the central region, and firms incur high cost in 
transporting raw materials.  
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To call off this chapter short, there are good-practiced issues from FDI in Uganda, 
including re-investment of earnings into new projects within the economy, which is a 
precondition for achieving the economic development. There is a sign towards the 
development of manufacturing sector which has the highest concentration of TNC 
activities in the economy, though agriculture traditionally dominates. However, the 
financial sector leads in actual investments than manufacturing.  Investors’ participation 
in utility sector has been minimal, and if so then it has been motivated by the energy 
crisis in the economy, not a deliberate participation. European countries (UK, USA and 
Canada) top investment lists in the economy, while African countries including Kenya 
and South Africa are also increasing their market shares. South Africa has a long term 
interest in the economy. Its involvement in the infrastructure sector has been of 
significance in reducing the cost of utility in the economy.  
 
As a developing country, this study found out that Uganda receives the highest number of 
TNCs in greenfield more than through M&As and Joint Ventures which is consonant 
with its level of development. However, the regional distribution of FDI in the economy 
is uneven, and is associated with the mass urbanizing region (central) which is contrary to 
the government’s position of promoting FDI to solve the economy’s development 
challenges. The Government will fail to address the development goal of improving 
household incomes as they might have projected.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT SPILLOVERS IN UGANDA’S ECONOMY 
5.1 Introduction:  
Spillovers are defined as benefits of FDI that occur through positive externalities  such as 
transfers of technology, enterprise development and restructuring, integration, bolstering 
of business competition and supporting human capital formation. This subsection 
emphasizes only benefits of FDI through its spillovers in Uganda’s economy.  
 
5.2   Export Development and Market Access:  
Agricultural exports stood at 68 per cent of the total exports in 2004, manufactured 
exports showed positive growth of 23 per cent, and minerals contributed 9 percent of the 
total exports.
1
 The number of exporting companies in Traditional exports increased from 
89 in 2004 to 127 in 2005 while exporting companies engaged in non-traditional 
sectors, excluding manufactures increased from 354 in 2004 to 414 in 2005.2  
 
Traditional exports as share of total exports continued to decrease for the last five 
consecutive years since 2001 because of the increase in the number of investing 
companies in non traditional crops as seen in table 4 below. 
 
 
_________________________ 
1UEPB annual report (2004 p.19) 
2Traditional exports in Uganda include coffee, cotton, tea, and tobacco. The Non Traditional 
exports include fish and fish products, floriculture, cereals and products, horticulture (fruits and 
vegetables), cocoa and products, spices, mining, gold, animals and products.  
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Table 4: The recovery of non traditional exports over traditional exports in per cent  
Year  1998 
(%) 
1999 
(%) 
2000 
(%) 
2001 
(%) 
2002 
(%) 
2003 
(%) 
2004 
(%) 
Non Traditional 
Exports 
34 29 47 62 61 61 62 
Traditional Exports  66 71 53 38 39 38 38 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 1000 
Source: UEPB Annual report 2004, p.4 and UEPB Aug 2004 p.14, increasing growth 
through exports.  
 
 
Non Traditional Exports since 2001 have surpassed traditional exports, contributing to 62 
per cent of the total export earnings. Floriculture is one of the leading non traditional 
exports and the average annual growth from 1998-2002 was valued at 28 percent, and 
Uganda is ranked number 28
th
 among the world exporters. 
 
More companies in non-traditional crops disapproved critics’ view that FDI in Uganda is 
attracted fundamentally in traditional export oriented products. Also, the non-traditional 
performance justifies the need for ‘performance incentives’ to reduce the cost of 
operation and make TNCs competitive. Especially, to flowers’ companies (including 
Pearl Flowers in Ntungamo district among others) which are exploiting demands in the 
EU and other western countries. This is because non-traditional sector rescues the 
economy by utilizing alternative means of marketing like air transport. 
 
Large companies in Uganda account for 18 per cent of the export enterprises and 
contribute to 89% of the total export earnings; medium companies take 21% of the 
exporting enterprises and contribute to 8% of the total export earnings. Small companies 
account for 50 % but contribute only to 3% of the total export earnings. 
3
 Hence, large 
companies benefit more from export earnings than medium and small enterprises.  
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This reflects the background of the economy that is agricultural based in coffee, tea, 
tobacco and cotton. Also, big enterprises are well established and resilience to economic 
vulnerabilities compared to medium and small enterprises that are more affected by the 
microeconomic variables such as non tariff barriers, inadequate governance, red tape, 
energy crisis, low standard labor and capital. The increasing numbers of foreign 
companies in non traditional crops have made Uganda’s economy to benefits from the 
market access in the regional blocks than ever before as illustrated in table five below.  
 
  Table 5: Uganda exports by regions in per cent  
Regions 2002 (%) 2003 (%) 2004 (%) 2005 (%) 
COMESA 24 28 26 31 
Other Africa 8 8 6 5 
EU 35 28 27 31 
Other Europe 18 16 17 10 
North America 2 3 3 2 
Middle East 2 3 6 11 
Asia 8 8 3 8 
South America 0 0 0 0 
Rest of the world 3 7 0 0 
  Source: UEPB 2004, p.8 and UEPB 2006: Export Performance Analysis 2005 
 
European Union leads on average as the market destination for Ugandan exporters since 
2002 because of the free market access under the Everything But Arms initiative. AGOA 
initiative in USA offers duty free market to 1830 products, textiles and apparels. Fish 
exports to USA in 2003 were valued at US$3.5 Million. Cut flower exports grew from 
US$1.4 to US$3.8 million in 2003.
4
 Generalized System Preference to Uganda is offered 
by countries like Canada, Japan, China, Switzerland, Russia, Turkey, Morocco and 
Norway. Ugandan exporters started accessing the market duty and quota free in EAC 
with the effect from 1
st
 January 2005, and 80 % tariff reduction in COMESA. 
_________________________ 
3UEPB (Aug. 2003, p.28) 
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Uganda has signed multiple agreements with many countries such as South Africa, Libya, 
Iran, China and Pakistan. Other countries on the list include: Rwanda, Sudan, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Burundi and Egypt.
5
 
  
EU averagely leads as the export destination of Uganda’s export not only because of the 
availability of EBA initiative plus other bilateral agreements, but as a reflection of the 
dominant numbers of foreign investors in the economy that hail from the region. They are 
engaged in traditional crops to supply their home countries, though others are engaged in 
non traditional crops. Also, sanitary and phytosanitary requirements limit Uganda’s 
exports to the EU, especially in non traditional crops not only because of hygienic factor, 
but due to the need of protecting domestic firms.    
 
5.3 Human Capital Development:  
Investing firms in Uganda play outstanding role in the development of human capital. 
The percentages of firms offering formal training are 29.67 percent, to permanent skilled 
workers are 25.69 per cent and employment growth over the last 3 years is 12.22 per 
cent.
6
 Trainings offered by firms should be seen not only in terms of the interest of 
corporatists, but most fundamentally in the development of local managerial skills that is 
needed for the local entrepreneurship.  
 
 
______________________ 
4UEBP (Aug. 2004, p.16) 
5UEPB (Sep. 2004, p.10) 
6The World Bank Group 2006: Economy Rankings - Doing Business - sub saharan 
africa.htm> 
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In addition, training is one of the ways of deepening the root of TNCs into the economy 
because new entrants find skilled man power trained already by the other TNCs and 
could be the benchmark for coordination in activities that they offer, hence the good 
outstanding practice.  
 
Employment growth over the last three years has been at 12.2 percent. However, this is 
not adequate enough for the fight against income poverty that has gained momentum at 
38 percent of the GDP. Moreover, the employment growth is shown in gross percentage 
which does not signify how many Ugandans benefit from the increase.  
 
With respect to the sectoral employment; manufacturing employs 26,875 workers 
accounting for 33 per cent of the employment; agriculture employs 16,076 workers 
(19%), financing employs 12,101 workers (14%), electricity has 402 (0.2%), construction 
has 10 per cent, wholesale 11 percent, transport and community both at 4 per cent, and 
others had 4 per cent.
7
  
 
Although manufacturing sector leads in employment, report on the size and capacity of 
TNCs engaged in the sector is not economically viable though it is a good start for the 
economy like Uganda which had been dominated by the agricultural sector. Most of the 
manufacturing firms are small and medium size enterprises from the South with limited 
scope of employment especially to the best talent available. They also operate below 
optimality to champion development in export sector. 
______________________ 
7UBOS, 2004, p.21 
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The total numbers of planned employment between the year 1991 to 2002 reached 
189,727 and 97,877 jobs were actually realized at the rate of 52 per cent as shown in 
Table 6 below.  
Table 6: FDI Employment in Uganda between the year 1991-2002 
Year  Investment (US $ millions) Employment (No. of jobs) 
Planned  Actual  Realization rate (%)  planned Actual  Realization rate (%) 
1991 16.03 16.43 102.5 514 514 57.0 
1992 374.43 331.55 88.5 11,480 13,953 121.5 
1993 581.62 741.83 127.5 23,967 26,957 112.5 
1994 399.57 273.61 68.5 30,783 13,201 42.9 
1995 642.07 451.25 70.3 24,380 11,197 45.9 
1996 680.80 350.68 51.5 25,368 9,666 38.1 
1997 533.93 453.61 85.0 17,271 8,440 48.9 
1998 361.15 271.42 75.2 8,715 4,661 53.5 
1999 625.30 98.88 15.5 6,371 2,933 46.0 
2000 296.70 7.20 2.4 9,158 5,565 60.8 
2001 273.69 18.49 6.8 16,650 n/a n/a 
2002 916.67 3.96 0.4 15,070 1,011 6.7 
Total  916.67 3,016.91 53.0 189,727 97,877 52.0 
Source: MIGA 2004 p.66: Investing in Developing Series. Washington D.C  
 
The highest actual realization rates of employment were only recorded between 1992 and 
1993 of 121.5% and 112.5% respectively because of high inflows of FDI at the beginning 
of liberalization with more greenfield investments that were labor intensive. The recent 
trends towards services reduce realization rates because services are more capital 
intensive. Through M&As, TNCs demand for highly skilled workers to fill in the 
technical and few clerical positions. These are also accompanied by restructuring and 
rationalization to maximize productivity.  
 
There is an outstanding issue pertaining ‘workforce diversity’ practiced by TNCs in 
Uganda. 
 
Table 7 below represents different job categories offered by investing 
enterprises in the economy. 
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Table 7: Employment by sex, nationality job category by 2001 
Nature of employment Local Foreign Total 
Male Female Male Female  
Administration 3,865 1,754 310 38 5,967 
Managerial 2,690 807 1,097 91 4,685 
Skilled/technical 16,527 4,505 577 64 21,673 
Unskilled 40,064 11,484 23 1 51,572 
Total 63,146 18,550 2,007 194 83,897 
Source: Private Sector Investment and Investment Perception in Uganda report 2003, published 
by UBOS, 2004, p.22 
 
Foreign investors employ more Ugandans in all the four different classes of jobs than the 
foreign experts. Ugandan women are comparatively employed in administrative 
positions, reflecting the good practice of recognizing diversity at workplace. Ugandans 
have also gained more from managerial skills and experience necessary for the 
development of local entrepreneurship.  
 
At this point, it can be argued that performance requirements of local employment are not 
necessarily the most important as shown in economy, in which more Ugandan are 
employed than foreigners. Uganda has a liberal policy of employment which is done at 
the discretion of foreign firms. Even unskilled Ugandans are more employed than skilled 
ones but, the question remains how much they get from foreign employers and labor 
standards and conditions of their jobs?   Lugazi-based SCOUL employs over 7,000 
permanent and casual workers.
8
 However, worker’s welfare is fundamentally not 
favorable, especially for unskilled workers. SCOUL’s workers in December 2006 had 
strike over non payments and poor working conditions, and even the payment is too low 
at Ushs 50,000 a month, and there is lack of proper medical facilities.  
_____________________________ 
8 The New Vision: Sunday, 30th April 2006: SCOUL staff stage strike  
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Uganda continues to receive spillovers of FDI through employment. The former victims 
of economic war are creating value for money in promotional efforts as reported by the 
UIA’s executive director: “Indians have created 7,839 jobs in the last five years through 
115 project investments amounting to Uganda shilling 170 billion”.9 In addition, “73,000 
people are employed in tourism sector with hospitality sub-sector employs about 57,000 
people and transport accounting for 16,000 jobs”,  according the PSFU.10 The telecom 
sector has created 290,000 jobs directly or indirectly,
 11
 SMEs comprise 90% of private 
sector in Uganda  and employ 1.9 million people.
12  
However, 1.9 million employments are inadequate as many Ugandans are unemployed. 
The private capacity to employ Ugandans is still low as many graduates are unemployed, 
thus necessitating attracting FDI through targeting. These figures are only stated at macro 
levels without references to who are those employed, regional locations, and more so, are  
just for building public confidence in FDI as a development alternative amidst smart 
state’s withdrawal from economic activities, even in areas that Uganda has good 
competitive edge and could complement the private employment.  
  
5.4 Backward and Forward linkages in the economy:  
As noted earlier in the literature that linkages depend on how TNCs obtain inputs, 
transfer technology, train, share information and provide financial support. This study 
analyses whether such good practices have been developed in Uganda’s economy.   
_________________________________ 
9 The New Vision, Sunday, 30th April, 2006: Indians create 7,800 jobs 
10 The New Vision, Sunday, 7th May, 2006: 73,000 employed in tourism  
11 The New Vision, Wednesday, 27th December 2006: Telecom sector creates 290,000 
jobs 
12 The New Vision, Sunday, 19th November, 2006: Small, Medium enterprises employ 
1.5m 
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Small-scale farmers in Uganda have benefited from financing, technical inputs and 
assured market at some reasonable prices from activities generated by TNCs. TNCs give 
loans to farmers to enable them acquire seeds, chemicals, fertilizers and pesticides and 
guidance on proper harvesting methods. 
13
 These are key milestones because farmers 
have no collaterals needed to obtain business loans. In addition, guidance on proper 
harvest complements government’s efforts in the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture.  
 
TNC serves as buying agency of primary commodity in Uganda. Kyagalangi Coffee Ltd 
is a joint venture between a Ugandan entrepreneur (20%) and a Swiss Volcafe Ltd (80%), 
which is the second biggest coffee trading company in the world.  Kyagalangi is one of 
the 18 export subsidiaries under Volcafe Group, and it is linked to other Volcafe 
importing/trading companies such as Rothfos/Halsen of Bremen, Geramny; Volcafe Ltd., 
Winterthur, Switzerland and Volcafe Ltd, Osaka, Japan. Kyagalangi enters into the most 
competitive market in the world and exported about $60million worth of coffee between 
1995/1996.
14
  
 
Volcafe Ltd. has therefore, integrated a local company (Kyagalangi) into the global 
economy through sharing skills and utilizing quality technologies, market intelligence 
and market outlets necessary for forward linkages with coffee farmers within the 
economy. 
   
 
_____________________________ 
13UNCTAD, 2000a, p.8 
14ibid13 p.13 
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A related example is that of North Bukedi Cotton Co., that was rescued through a 
strategic alliance of joint venture between the local North Bukedi Co-operative Union 
and foreign African Resources Ltd of South Africa to minimize challenges in cotton 
growing and marketing. The Co-operative Union mobilizes farmers and other extension 
services while foreign partner provides assured market through their global networks. 
The company currently exports to USA, Middle East and Europe.
15
  
 
The alliance is of great importance to the new company because it involves sharing 
technical knowledge in marketing which had been an obstacle to the former North 
Bukedi Co. Ltd. In addition, African Resource Ltd has also benefited from the local 
knowledge in mobilizing farmers that would not have  worked well if it was to be taken 
by The African Resource Limited due to differences in cultures, that might require local 
modes of communication to farmers.   
 
Britania Products Ltd from India is linked with the local suppliers in Uganda. It engages 
in manufacturing and distribution of confectionary products. It has 14 product brands, 
employs 600 people, and it has got 200 agents countrywide and over 600 retailers. It gets 
inputs from local suppliers. It also exports to the DRC, Rwanda, Southern Sudan and 
Northern Tanzania.
16
 
 
 
_____________________________ 
15 UNCTAD (2000a, p.13) 
16UNCTAD (2000a, p.14) 
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While its role is prominent in creating employment, forward linkages, diversified 
products, networking with local agents and retail traders, and promoting exports, the 
company can still relieves itself from the distribution role through outsourcing local 
transporters and then concentrate on increasing its production capacity. 
 
 Amfri Farm Ltd is involved in the growing and exports of organic fruits and vegetables. 
It started in 1990 with 25 individual out growers and cooperative farms by a Swiss 
engineer with an initial investment of $20,000, using self-developed energy technology 
for processing fruits and vegetables. The company now has got 82 out-growers. Major 
developments have been in the certification by the Swiss Institute for Market Ecology 
(IMO) to process and market organic products in compliance with the EU Regulation 
(EEC) No. 2092/91; advising and supporting out grower farmers with techniques in 
organic and sustainable farming; development of company-owned farm in organic 
production and a pack house facility; development of continuous improvement of solar 
driers to increase efficiency; certification (in May 2003) by USDA AMT CFR part 205, 
National Organic Program.  
 
The company handles a wide range of products, both fresh (pineapples, apple bananas, 
ginger, passion fruit, baby aubergines, okra, matoke and hot pepper) and dried 
(pineapples, apple bananas, papaya, and mangoes). It owns a farm of 1,500 acres in 
Luwero, 450 acres of which are certified as organic. At the moment, 90% of the produce 
comes from the out growers but future plans are to increase company farm production so 
that 40% of the export produce come from the farm. The company has 25 permanent and 
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75 casual workers and owns 50 drying units. The project uses a vacuum gauging 
machine, the only of its kind in Uganda. Exports of 1-2 tons of fresh fruit started in 2000 
but by the end of 2002, over 282 tons of fresh and dried fruits and vegetables were 
realized, earning $35,000 for the company. In the past, the main market was Switzerland, 
but now the market has expanded to include Canada, Norway, Germany, and the United 
States.
17
  
 
In fact, targeted incentives should be given to Quality Company like this because of its 
innovativeness in the use of alternative source of energy, research and development, 
acquiring 90% of its produce from out growers and expanding market in EU. Such 
outstanding practices promote export competitiveness, diversify products and improve on 
the income level of the poor employed in small and medium farming via forward 
linkages. 
 
Backward and forward linkages have only developed naturally in Uganda’s economy, 
and are in the best interest to the economy because of creating competitive environment 
for local firms and integration into the world economy, and creating employment within 
local enterprises. However, small and medium enterprises needed for the linkage 
development are still small and weak; there is a slow response rate because of lack of 
technical and financial capacity to implement urgently the required changes in their 
managerial systems and technological base needed for the development of local 
absorptive capacity.  
______________________ 
17UN (2004, p.34) 
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SMEs account for 90 % of non-farm employment and local enterprises own around 38% 
of investment projects licensed by the UIA between 1991 and 2000. 
18 
It is importance to 
note that TNCs are motivated by profits that take into consideration the capacity of local 
enterprises to deliver quality inputs so as to minimize the cost of doing business.  
 
5.5 Technological spillovers: 
The role of FDI in telecom sector has been highly recognized in solving the country’s 
technology problems. MTN Uganda Ltd joined business in Uganda since 1998 through a 
concession of 20 years for the provision of telecom services. It is now the leading mobile 
industry in the economy with over 70% of 350,000 lines. In addition, Celtel Uganda has 
got 60,000 lines, Uganda Telecom has a network of 140,000 lines, and 40,000 lines rest 
in the hand Mango telecom–Uganda.19  
 
Leapfrogging in the telephone industry has filled in the information gap, Ugandans have 
ever longed for via greenfield investments from MTN, Celtel, Uganda Telecom and new 
entrant Warid Telecom from Abu Dhabi. Leapfrogging has got multiplier effects of 
attracting prospective investors because competition drives the cost of utility down and 
improves on TNC competitiveness. Uganda’s economy has benefited more from the 
technology transfer in telecom sector, and has helped in building the confidence in 
foreign investors. 
 
     
______________________ 
18UN (2005, p.29) 
19 www.ugandainvest.com  
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Ugandan firms have benefited from technology transfers and received the highest rating 
of 3.95, out of a maximum weight of 5.00 in 1998 UNCTAD’s survey. However, field 
visits revealed low level of technology. Machinery tends to be old and lacks 
reinvestment. Technology upgrading requires technical and engineering skills. 
 
 Uganda’s satisfaction is far from the comparative position. Uganda’s technical 
enrollment index is 2.06 and engineering enrollment index is 1.78 compared Mauritius 
with 7.16 technical index enrollment and 6.8 engineering index. South Africa has got 
technical enrollment index of 23.61 and engineering enrollment of 17.32 that is necessary 
for technological competency.  
 
However, the low enrollment index in Uganda is not a guarantee that foreign firms 
employ all the technically qualified people. Uganda’s firms prefer employment few 
technical people and use unskilled ones because they pay low wages. Enrollment in 
technical education sometime is not only about government’s policy towards it, but the 
marginal return to trainees motivates others to join the industry. For example, a survey of 
121 firms carried out by UIA Technology Consultant Survey in 1998 showed that, out of 
121 firms surveyed; only 115 engineers and 240 technicians were employed.
20 
Suggesting 
that firms would employ one to two respectively, and this shows how firms minimize 
costs on trained employees, but employed more unskilled people to work in tiles, paints, 
fabrication, footwear, plastics and timber, did not employ qualified engineers or 
technicians.
 
________________________ 
20UNCTAD (2000a, p.9) 
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The argument is that it depends on the kind of corporate interests and the type of TNCs 
government attracts in the sector, but not only on the high technical enrollment rates. In 
addition, linkages between foreign and local enterprises in Uganda are still at the infant 
phase that limits technological spillovers. However, training of employees by TNCs 
enhances the possibility of acquiring technological skills.   
 
A survey by UNIDO in 2006 shows that out of 48 enterprises that were interviewed in 
Uganda, 30 enterprises (62.5%) provided training and only 18 enterprises (37.5) had no 
training for their employees.
21
 Training develops the absorptive capacity in the host 
economy and strengthens host’s capabilities to adopt the technological competency.  
 
5.6 Enterprise Development and Restructuring: 
 
Uganda has registered successful stories of enterprise development and restructuring. 
Hima Cement was privatized in December 1994 and was incorporated into a new 
company called Hima Cement (1994) Uganda Limited, and later taken by Bamburi 
Cement. Bamburi Cement, a subsidiary of Lafarge together with Lafarge itself acquired 
100% shares from the previous owners.
22
 The company was renamed Hima Cement Ltd 
and now owned by Bamburi Cement and eventually Lafarge which is the world biggest 
building materials company.  
 
Under Hima Cement Ltd, production had increased to 170,000 tons per annum because of 
improved efficiency by 1999. New investors (Lafarge) have increased the plant’s 
production capacity to 305, 000 tons per annum. Investment since May 1999 reached 
US$ 13 million in plant modernization, quality, safety and training programs reflecting 
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market growth internally and in the neighboring countries. Hima Cement currently 
employs 393 staff (329 permanent + 64). In terms revenues to the government, Hima 
Cement paid annually Ushs 4.1 billion in direct taxes (corporate tax) and Ugandan 
shillings 8.6 billion in indirect taxes (excise, VAT, duties).  
 
In building its image in the economy, Hima supports corporate social responsibility 
principles in the community in the areas like health, education, shelter and the 
environment. Hima’s support include: Universal Primary Education (constructed Hima 
Primary School in Kasese); constrction of pit latrines in schools and reforestation in 
Kasese.  
 
Hima commits US$ 50,000 every year for Corporate Social Responsibility and US$ 40, 
000 is spent annually on women and men sports. Hima plans to invest US$95m for its 
expansion in factory, mining project at Dura and construction of grinder at the Kampala 
Business Park in the year 2007. Also, Hima recognizes government’s policy of levying 
Ushs 500 on each bag of cement for infrastructure.
23
  
 
 
 
 
_____________________________ 
21UNIDO (2006, p.92) 
22Privatization and Utility sector Reform Project –Uganda at http://www.perds.go.ug/ 
23The New Vision, Sunday, 5th November 2006 
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Hima has the “best practiced outcome” from foreign investors by engaging in contract 
services with local firms in Uganda such as in transportation, maintenance, and security 
provision among others. Even in implementing the principles of corporate social 
responsibility, Hima is acting as a good example for the prospective of implementing the 
Global Compact in Uganda.  
 
Another case in enterprise development is Rwenzori Highland Tea Company Limited. 
Government sold its remaining 6.8 percent shares in Rwenzori Highland Tea Company 
Limited at Ugandan shillings 1.48 billion with additional Ushs 250 million fee for 
settlement of outstanding dividends. RHTCL is owned by Finlays Group, which in turn 
owned by the Swire Group UK and since its establishment in 1994, the company is now 
Uganda’s single largest producer of black tea, accounting for quarter of country’s tea 
exports. The company invested US$ 45 million since 1994 and tea estates have been 
rehabilitated, factory upgraded, machines replaced and Ugandan managers trained. 
24
 In a 
similar way, the company added value by investing in capital and training employees.  
 
5.7 Competition: 
The investment code of 1991 allows foreigners to invest in all activities, except those 
related to national security or requiring ownership of land. Uganda imposes no limit on 
equity ownership, and foreign ownership can be 100%. Foreign investors are free to bring 
in and take out capital.
25
 As a result; there is productive competition in the financial 
sector, manufacturing and the telecom sector. 
_________________________________ 
24 UNCTAD (2000a, p.7) 
25UNCTAD (2000a, p.51) 
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Standard Chartered Bank of Uganda, Stanbic Bank Uganda, Barclays, Bank of Baroda, 
DFCU Bank and Aon Bank are the biggest competitors in the financial sector.
 
   
 
Uganda has a liberal (open) competition policy and prices are determined by market 
forces. There are few state monopolies remaining and most of them have started 
outsourcing managerial functions to steer competition, including the Electricity 
Company. There are numbers of independent power generating firms after liberalization 
of the energy sector. These include: Vital Peaks from Malaysia and China Shan Sheng 
industry among others, which can reduce the monopoly of Umeme Company Ltd that has 
a concession of 20 years in power distribution.  
 
Competition in telecom services is of beneficial to the economy. In December 2006, 
Uganda Telecom Commission has awarded the local arm of Adu Dhabi based Warid 
Telecom a license to operate phone services; 
26
 becoming the forth mobile network 
operator in Uganda after MTN, Celtel and Uganda Telecom. This is meant to allow 
market forces play the role in pricing. According to ICT minister; “Private investment in 
the sector since January 2004 December 2006 was about US$180m compared to US$ 
15m between 1999 and 2000”. “Since 2004, there has been tremendous development in 
the sector. The tele-density (number of phones per 100 people both mobile and fixed 
lines) has improved from 2.4 % in 2004 to 6.5 % in 2006”. “The network coverage is in 
745 sub-counties of the 926 sub counties, which amounts to 80% of geographical 
coverage and 10,000 public pay phones installed”.  
______________________ 
26 The New Vision, Friday, 8th Decemder, 2006:  
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However, there are currently no laws governing competition between firms. The recent 
takeovers by big companies are aimed at reducing the number of companies. For 
example, in financial sector, Barclays Bank of Uganda Buys out Nile Banks and Crane 
Bank takes over Standhope, these moves reduce competition in the financial sector. This 
is because there are no anti-trust laws regulating investment environment. 
 
To sum up this chapter, Uganda has benefited more from FDI spillovers. In export 
development and market access, the total share of Traditional Exports continues to 
decrease consecutively since 2001 because of the increase in the number of investing 
companies in non traditional crops, and Uganda is able to access markets in the regional 
blocks than ever before. 
 
In paving the way for human capital development, findings show that TNCs offer both 
formal and on job training and employment growth is more than 10 per cent over every 
three years. However, high actual employment rates were only recorded in two peaks of 
1992 and 1993 during the initial period of liberalization, and have dramatically been 
reduced because of the recent growth of FDI through Mass, and trends towards services.  
 
Even without performance requirements, TNCs recognized work force diversity. Women 
are employed in administrative positions, and more Ugandans are employed in 
managerial positions compared to foreign counterparts. However, unskilled laborers 
benefit from FDI, but have poor job context and low motivation.   
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Linkages have developed naturally between TNCs and SMEs without performance 
requirements in Uganda. There are some registered outstanding cases that are beneficial 
to the economy: Kyagalangi Coffee Ltd. buys coffee (forward linkages) from Ugandan 
farmers and has integrated the economy into the global economy, North Bukedi Cotton. 
Ltd markets Ugandan cotton in North America, Middle East and Europe. Britania 
Products Ltd is linked up with the local suppliers in Uganda while Amfri Farm Ltd is 
known for promoting out growers and using alternative source of energy. In spite of 
these, linkages are still at the infant phase in Uganda.  
 
Creating public value in telecommunication sector has been the most significant benefits 
from TNCs in Uganda. Leapfrogging in telephone industry has filled in information gaps 
by companies like MTN Uganda, Celtel Uganda and the new entrant Warid telecom from 
Abu Dhabi, a move from a monopolistic market to oligopolistic market. With regards to 
enterprise development and restructuring, the economy has benefited most in terms of 
improving performance of enterprises after privatization. Hima Cement Ltd production 
capacity has doubled after restructuring; its market has expanded at the regional level. 
Similarly, Rwenzori Highland Tea Company has been rehabilitated, and currently is the 
single biggest producer and exporter of black tea. Hence, productive competition has  
been generating by TNCs in the economy including the financial, manufacturing and 
telecom, but the recent development in the financial sector in terms of take over is 
intended to avoid competition; moreover, Uganda has no anti-trust laws regulating 
investment environments.  
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CHAPTER SIX  
STRATEGIC POLICIES FOR IMPROVING FOREGIN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
DESIRABILITY IN UGANDA’S ECONOMY 
6.1 Introduction:  
This section discusses possible strategies for maximizing benefits of FDI in Uganda’s 
economy. For the government to succeed in achieving its development objectives through 
FDI, it has to consider different stakeholders’ groups, and their interests and expectations.  
International experiences are also internalized into the discussion. Strategic issues facing 
the economy are identified; why they are strategic? What are the consequences of not 
addressing the issues? This study answers the question of why the Government of 
Uganda is facing opposition now when it tends to adopt micro policies, than ever before 
when it implemented macro policies. This study ends by discussing alternative strategies 
to be pursued by the Government of Uganda.  
 
6.2 The stakeholders’ Analysis:  
Developing strategic issues needs understanding of stakeholders that affected or are 
affected by FDI policies, criteria they use to assess the performance of FDI and how well 
the Government of Uganda performs against those criteria. In analyzing how various 
stakeholders influence FDI in Uganda, this study uses Power versus Interest grid analysis. 
This analysis accommodates political issues at hand, and stakeholders that affect FDI in 
the future.  Four categories of stakeholders are identified: 1) players are those who have 
significant interest and power, 2) subjects are those who have power but little interest, 3) 
context setters are those that have power but little direct interest, and 4) members of the 
‘crowd’ are those with little interest and little power as done in illustration 2 below.  
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Hence, this analysis identified key players in the economy, those people whose power 
must be taken into consideration, the need for collaboration in creating strategic issues. 
This study looks at what the Government of Uganda needs from each group. In the 
section of players, which include the president, executive and heads of department, they 
are supposed to be initiators and champions in instilling the spirit of developing 
alternative strategies in order to maximize benefits from FDI. These include pushing for a 
breakthrough into the creation of regional integration (East African Community), 
maintaining good political relations with Kenya and Tanzania, seeking funding from 
Subjects  
 Foreign investors  
 Donors  
 TNC agents 
 Trade associations 
 Private sector Fondtn   
Players  
 President 
 Executives  
 Ministries (finance and 
trade and tourism, etc) 
 Heads of departments  
Crowd  
 Property owners (land 
etc)  
 Consumers 
 Society  
 Civic society   
 Farmers  
Context setters  
 Legislatures  
 Local government 
land board  
 Local councils  
 Neighboring countries  
 Traditional leaders  
 Environmentalists  
Low  
High  
In
te
re
st
  
Illustration 2: Power versus Interest 
Grid Analysis 
Low  
High  
       Power  
Source: Eden and Ackermann, 1998.p.122, adapted in Bryson 2004 p.338. 
Strategic Planning in Public and Non-for Profit Organizations, Jossy –Bass 
Publication.   
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NEPAD and Donors to upgrade railways and road networks to the sea. Internally, they 
are supposed to work together with traditional leaders, communal land owners, and 
political parties. Players are satisfied when TNCs promote growth and economic 
development.  
 
Subjects also need attention from the Government of Uganda. TNCs need cheap transport 
to the sea, low cost of utilities, domestic confidence, and not economic nationalism, as 
well as land for large scale production. Donors would like to see a private sector led 
economy, less corrupt government, reduction in regulations, and reduced cost of doing 
businesses in the economy. TNC agents, including those who have developed linkages 
naturally with TNCs expect greater utilization of their inputs by TNCs. Trade unions 
want good labor standards, and safe working environments. Importers and exporters want 
the number of procedures reduced, and improved infrastructural services.   
 
Context setters are really very important for developing collaboration strategy. 
Legislatures from Northern Uganda want to maintain the communal property right 
ownership of land to their constituencies, and ready to go for war if players proceed to 
allocating land to foreign investors. Environmentalists want preservation of natural 
forests and forest reserves, which the Government of Uganda is giving to foreign 
investors to be withheld.  
 
The crowd including land owners wants to keep land for future generations. Society 
expects corporate social responsibility from TNCS, while civil society emphasizes TNCs’ 
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fair business practices, respecting the country’s cultural values and redistribution. 
Farmers expect TNCs to buy their products.  
 
This study prioritizes stakeholders that have to be involved in strategic planning if 
Uganda’s economy is to benefit from FDI.  These include all the major players listed 
above, TNCs and donors, legislatures, local councils and environmentalists, land owners 
and civil society organizations.   
 
6.3 Applying SWOC Analysis:  
The acronym SWOC means strengths and weaknesses which are related to internal 
environment, opportunities and challenges relate to the external environment. SWOC 
analysis of Uganda’s economy is presented in appendix D, provides benchmark for 
identifying strategic issues. Although, Uganda’s economy has achieved strong 
macroeconomic stability that is needed for exploiting numerous opportunities that exist in 
the economy, these are static benefits at macro levels. Translating benefits to nearly all 
the population would allow the economy, not only to win the confidence of foreign 
investors, but also domestic confidence, which is a dynamic approach that corrects 
weaknesses and challenges in the economy. 
 
6.4. Identifying strategic issues facing Uganda’s Economy:  
This study focuses on what the Government of Uganda is expected to do, but not what 
government should do. What government should do is usually based on intended 
objective of changing the way government runs FDI related activities (set of criteria 
which the economy must meet), but what government is expected to do only brings in 
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ideas that might be useful for exploiting benefits from FDI if other things are improved 
on. This study also internalizes the international experience of countries that have 
strategically succeeded in adopting FDI policies to answer some of policy questions:  
1. How can Government of Uganda address the energy crisis in the economy?  
There is a natural barrier in this sector that creates monopoly, which is characterized by 
heavy capital investment and sunk costs. This makes entry into the sector limited. Even if 
it is opened to private developers, the marginal cost of providing it to additional 
consumers is low, and this leads to under consumption. There is always political 
economy of regulation through price ceiling.  
2. How can Government of Uganda improve on its cheap transport to the sea?  
There are long delivery periods and delays to Uganda’s exporters that reduce the 
competitiveness of manufacturing enterprises, coupled by the persistent high cost of 
transport to the sea.  
3. How can land be made available to foreign investors?   
The constitution of Uganda does not allow investors to own land, unless it is organized 
through joint ventures with local investors, yet the acquisition of land is a key milestone 
to the implementation of any planned project.  
4. How can Government of Uganda support and deepen linkages between foreign and 
domestic enterprises?  
Linkages have only developed naturally between few TNCs and SMEs. There is poor 
development of local enterprises to benefit from spillovers in terms of employment, local 
skills, technological coping from TNCs, and solving limited market for their products. 
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5. How can uneven regional distribution of FDI be minimized? 
There is regional concentration of TNCs in the central. Also, there is poor infrastructural 
development in regions with few or inadequate FDI.   
6. How can Government of Uganda tackle persistent corruption?  
Foreign firms in Uganda pay bribes when seeking public utilities and this has affected 
their operations.  
7. How can Government of Uganda improve on low purchasing power in domestic 
market? There is high income poverty in Uganda which affects the market-oriented 
foreign investors due to low demand.  
 
6.4.1 Prioritizing strategic issues: 
This study subjects the above seven strategic issues to litmus test. 
1
 The following issues 
are prioritized accordingly: 
1. Addressing the energy crisis in the economy comes first because it determines 
productivity and competitiveness in the manufacturing sector. The high cost of 
production affects locational decisions of already existing and prospective TNCs. In 
addition, there is under productivity of non tradables because the economy can not 
meet production targets. 
2. Improving on access to the sea comes second. This is needed to ease exporters’ 
accessibility to regional markets, and reduce costs and delays to the sea. It involves 
political negotiations and compromises to finalize the materialization of East African 
Community, plus donor‘s assistance in funding infrastructural projects. 
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3. Land availability to foreign investors comes third reflecting the recent lead trend in 
entry mode through greenfield that are needed in commercial agriculture, and 
increasing production capacity of essential investments like sugar industry. Also, 
foreign investors will be driven more towards services which tend to be market 
oriented, rather than in the primary sector where most of the poor are employed. 
Failures to manage politicians and communal land ownership means continuity in the 
subsistence production with no linkages to the supply resourced-oriented FDI. 
4. Supporting and deepening linkages between domestic and foreign enterprises comes 
fourth. Linkages are needed in building a dynamic private sector led economy, which 
is characterized by positive externalities capable of achieving development objectives 
of reduced poverty, sustained employment, business competition among others.  
5. Tackling persistent corruption comes fifth. It will allow the SMEs grow, and investors 
will also respond positively to investment opportunities in Uganda’s economy.  
6. Last is the regional distribution of FDI enterprises which are needed for the balanced 
development in underdeveloped regions. 
_________________________ 
1Litmus test identifies and frames strategic issues, categorizes whether the issue is 
operational or strategic.  
Issues which require significant policy board involvement; very challenging that needed 
different stakeholders than a single party; requiring changes in objectives, development 
of new program and funding plus long effects on the economy are strategic  
While issues which do not require significant policy board involvement; not very 
challenging in management of stakeholders a single party; do not require changing 
objectives, and do not need the development of new program and funding plus long no 
effects on the economy are operational (Bryson2004, p.95: strategic planning in public 
organizations, Jossey-Bass Publication).  
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6.5 How Can the Government of Uganda Formulate and adopt 
strategic plan for FDI attraction? 
1. What is required?  
The plan the government of Uganda can pursue is the grand strategy, especially in the 
energy development, improving access to the sea, land development, linkages and 
regional distribution of foreign investors. In this strategic plan, the Government of 
Uganda always responds to the environment in a crisis planning rather than a deliberate 
plan. While the deliberate strategy in energy development, cheap access to sea, land 
development, deepening linkages and regional distribution remains fundamentally 
essential, things don’t always work as planned, crisis planning should be maintained on 
energy sector that depends on nature (volume of water in Lake Victoria) characterized by 
period of drought as well as improving access to sea, and involves political compromise 
in policy development and implementation of agreements between Uganda, Kenya and 
Tanzania.  
 
2. What action steps government has to pursue?  
a) In the energy sector: TNCs operate below capacity due to inadequate power and load 
shedding. Hence, further liberalization and privatization is expected to encourage private 
investments in dams through greenfield and joint ventures. Also, it has to maximize the 
window opportunity of donor’s support to the private sector led economy to finance 
energy development, plus the NEPAD’s support in energy development. Government of 
Uganda can use the system of build-transfer-operate scheme as practiced in China, 
Vietnam, and Malaysia. 
3
 This transfer system of power production to private sector 
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minimizes management costs; reduces corruption that is rampant during utility 
connections.  
 Furthermore, doing it the south-south way is very important. Government of Uganda has 
to target South African investors because of their long term commitment in the energy 
sector. With the already existing investors such as Eskom and Umeme companies Ltd, 
targeted incentives can be used to exploit the opportunity rather than relying only donor 
funded projects, through Joint ventures and franchise rights. Also, a more operational 
goal is to use energy saving bulbs and solar panels. 
 
b) On easing access to the sea: Uganda is a landlocked country, and its infrastructure 
suffers poor maintenance and negligence. Government of Uganda is expected to promote 
FDI in infrastructure development, through joint development funds for infrastructure 
upgrading between Kenya and The Republic of Tanzania. Illustrative case can be seen in 
Kazakhstan’s role in overcoming the “tyranny of geography.” 4 It is 2000 Km from the 
sea, but received $2.6 billion of FDI in 2002, the highest among all landlocked 
developing countries. Its uniqueness is that major investors do not originate from 
neighboring countries, but from USA that leads, followed by UK, Canada and Italy. 
However, comparatively, Uganda is only 1,200 Km to the sea, though it is not that rich in 
natural resources like oil deposits and natural gas, but can internalize the collaboration 
strategy with foreign companies, that have been the central resource development in 
Kazakhstan, especially, in the pipeline, distribution of power, gas and water, 
characterized companies’ role in easing the cost of doing. Hence, it is possible to 
overcome geographical constraints when supported by policy makers in any host 
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economy.  GOU has to improve on the utilization capacity of ODA in infrastructural 
development and upgrading of road and railways. This is evident from the experience of 
the fastest- growing economies (Malaysia, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan) before 
financial crises of 1990s. It is important to invest in capital rather consumption. 
 
More importantly is the continuous maintenance of political support and acknowledging 
the significance of political compromises in regional initiatives. For example, China 
benefited much from FDI by improving its relations with North Korea and Taiwan. 
Bolivia and Paraguay are good examples of landlocked developing countries that have 
enhanced their ability to overcome geographical limitations via regional integration. 
Bolivia belongs to Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) and the Andean 
Community, and has a free trade agreement with MERCOSUR (The Southern Common 
Market). Paraguay is a member of MENSOCUR, and has a special status with Adean 
Community. Moreover, these regional blocks have some negotiating power with other 
trading blocks, including Free Trade Areas of America (FTAA).  
 
In a similar line of thinking, the inland location of Uganda provides an easy access to 
East African Countries that have become the hub of regional activities to serve the entire 
region, thus it is an opportunity because neighboring countries have become trading 
partners, and this opens up the gate for Uganda to attract the Headquarters of TNCs.   In 
further respond to FDI and geography, creating competitiveness in areas that are less 
sensitive to transport costs, development of needed skills and technology are viable 
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strategies. Uzbekistan success in attracting FDI in its telecommunications industry 
provides an example that accounted for 1/3 of FDI stocks in 1997. 
 
c) Addressing land question: The constitution of Uganda does not allow investors to own 
land; instead land belongs to the community. Hence, there is need for political 
compromise and transparent land policy of the affected community. Hence, transition 
from communal ownership to private ownership takes time as peasantry gets absorbed in 
the capitalist world. For instance, most of the countries that emerged out of feudalism to 
private ownership did it through political strategy of concessions rather than for the sake 
of market oriented economy. In Uganda, where most of the land ownership is defined by 
the customary arrangements, no force is necessary because Uganda is a signatory of 
United Nations (equal access to property rights is the fundamental right of humankind).  
Stakeholders should be involved in the strategic investment planning to facilitate land 
accessibility to prospective investors. Even districts should avail lists of lands available to 
investors, including those for sales and leasing through concessions. Private investors 
should deal with land owners directly to facilitate land leasing. These arrangements 
reduce the problem of relying only on UIA for land acquisition. 
 
d) On supporting and deepening TNC-SME linkages. There is poor development of local 
enterprises to benefit from spillovers. Hence, TNCs are expected to outsource local firms 
in construction, professional services, and non core services such as cleaning. Giving 
SMEs the distributional role of their products remains a viable option. More loans to 
manufacturers are needed because they dominate FDI activities, plus an integrated 
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funding to SMEs from development banks. UIA is expected to target specific subsets of 
TNCs, on top of providing information on new suppliers. For example, Malaysia used 
targeted incentives for specific subsets of TNCs.
5
 TNCs then transferred technology to 
local firms, training suppliers and agents, sharing information and financial support.  
 
The role UIA is to focus on skills enhancement, which is needed to shape the absorptive 
capacity, in addition to attracting lead firms for future specialization. The promotion of 
business linkages is likely to be successful, only if a systematic policy approach is 
adopted for all factors influencing linkages, and can lead to spillovers. We can learn from 
the examples of Thailand, Ireland, Singapore and Taiwan.
6
 Ireland focused on attracting 
quality FDI rather than upgrading existing FDI, and then later emphasized on linkages. 
Similarly, Singapore had been having industrial strategy in promotional-seeking of FDI 
through EPZs to reduce transaction costs to foreign investors, and employed relevant 
skills upgrading on top of industrial policies, macroeconomic and infrastructure support.  
 
As noted earlier on that the country’s capability to maximize FDI spillovers depends on 
the absorptive capacity in the host economy, Malaysia and India have good educational 
policy to shape absorptive capacity and SMEs linkages, appropriate local incentives for 
local sourcing and give research institutions incentives for their findings. Malaysia is one 
of those countries with a relatively clear policy focus, with FDI explicitly playing a 
prominent role within its industrialization strategy.
7
 Malaysia and Thailand pursued 
active industrial policies and promote local enterprises in certain activities, but adopted 
effectively open door, non interventionist policies in some export oriented industry. 
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Singapore sought heavy TNCs participation in deepening manufacturing, promoting 
linkages and increasing local capabilities, based on strong selective aspects to practically 
all interventions. These are wealth of experiences that can be internalized according to 
development needs of the economy like Uganda that needs to deepen SMEs linkages. 
 
e) Tackling persistent corruption: Government of Uganda is expected to tackle 
corruption seriously. The Sector Survey of 2005 ranked corruption as the second most 
hindrance after volatile exchange rate. Foreign firms in Uganda pay bribes when seeking 
public utilities and this has affected their operations. Government of Uganda needs to 
institute ombudsman that is powerful, to check on the unethical behaviors of bureaucrats. 
They should be given the authority to report independently, propose dismissals of public 
officials caught in the act. More so, an independent court should be instituted for trying 
those who are involved, especially in the commercial courts of justice.  
 
e) On uneven regional development: Uganda’s government is facing opposition from 
communal land owners, because land belongs to the community not government.   
Government of Uganda is expected to provide incentives for regional development so as 
to correct the market failure in allocation, and up country incentive rate should be 
increased from 75% to 100% to spur industrial growth in the regions where infrastructure 
is inadequate to influence locational decisions of TNCs. In addition, UIA should be 
targeting specific activities to exploit regional advantages.  
_____________________ 
3UNCTAD (1996, p.22) 
4UNCTAD (2003b, p.4-5, 8&11) 
5UNCTAD (2002, p.206) 
6Te Velde (2001, p.29 &42-47) 
7OECD (2005, p.11-12) & UNCTAD (2006b, p.10-13) 
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CHAPTER SEVEN   
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Introduction and Major Suggestions:  
This section highlights recommendations to identified strategic issues, conclusions, 
limitation of the study, and the future research agenda. Government of Uganda needs to 
liberalize the energy sector, not only by allowing TNCs rely on their self-provided 
generators. Opening up the energy sector will provide alternative sources of energy, in 
which private developers can have joint ventures with government and other 
development partners to develop dams. This relieves the economy’s reliance on Owen 
Falls Dam as the only main source of power. Hence, establishing low-cost operating 
environment, including power development and employing the latest technology reduces 
risks in the economy of relying on hydro as the only source of power.   
 
Easing access to the sea needs provision of political risk incentives to targeted investors. 
Political risk incentives will encourage private developers to inject money in transport 
development that tends to be characterized by oligolispolistic conditions. This results 
from heavy capital investment, high risk of political interferences and sunk costs. This 
study recommends the need to use ODA in capital investment for upgrading railways 
lines and roads to the sea, in addition to maintaining good political relations with Kenya 
and Tanzania. 
 
Encouraging Corporate Social Responsibility in social and infrastructural services 
reduces poor perception on FDI role as a development alternative. This improves on the 
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domestic confidence, and communal land ownership can lease their land to TNCs. Ease 
restrictions on land ownership by managing stakeholders.  
 
Enhancing FDI spillovers remains the sole role the GOU has to pursue, through targeting 
specific industries of potential success is needed for promoting development of TNC-
SME linkages, which have only evolved naturally in Uganda. Cases from Malaysia, 
Singapore and Ireland have shown that deliberate linkages have greater impact on host 
economies; hence developing economy like Uganda needs to target specific industries. 
Furthermore, policies for long term financing are viable options for strengthening SMEs 
in export development. The approach to Multi-Facility Economic zones need to be 
speeded up, in order to realize increased exports and linkage developments. Quality 
government information is also useful for developing good TNC-SME linkages, 
especially, on area of technological transfers and sourcing. This information shows the 
need for particular types of technology that is relevant to the host’s capabilities and 
development. Hence, training is expected to be extended to SMEs for strengthening their 
capability, and more so to particular areas where spillovers effects from TNCs.  
 
In addition, Government of Uganda’s role in minimizing uneven regional distribution of 
TNC activities is very essential in realizing the Poverty Reduction Action Plan of 
increasing household incomes.  Hence, government can target specific sets of FDI to 
invest in different regions in the economy by using of targeted subsidies.  
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In conclusions, fiscal incentives are necessary evils for Uganda’s economy which has not 
yet evolved truly in laying the basic foundations for a viable private sector led economy. 
Third generation policy helps in attracting FDI to host development objectives, makes it 
possible to attract export oriented FDI rather resource–seeking FDI. The role of UIA has 
been very effective in general marketing to attract FDI, but not much in targeting specific 
types of FDI which could turn around the economy, where direct marketing works well 
rather than using embassies for distributing investment materials, and managing land 
owners who leased land to foreign investors. FDI alone is not a necessary condition for 
economic development unless it is complemented by the host policies in increasing the 
absorptive capacity for its spillovers. Hence, deliberate strategy avoids pursuance of 
isolationism in national development objectives. This is because FDI benefits are not 
automatic, and sometimes it tends to benefits few individuals and TNCs, hence deliberate 
policy will direct host’s interest.  
 
 
7.2 Limitation of the study:  
This study only evaluated Government of Uganda’s efforts to use FDI as an alternative 
development paradigm, based on benefits of FDI through spillovers, and policy options 
for maximization. Taking empirical perspectives of foreign direct investors would be a 
future gap to be filled.  
 
7.3 Research Agenda for the future: 
Based on the findings of the current thesis, the researcher was able to identify several 
areas for potential future research as follows: 
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 A thematic analysis of the role of President Museveni in making policy with regards 
to FDI as an alternative development paradigm in Uganda’s Economy.   
 How regionalism impact on FDI into Uganda.   
 The role of FDI in reducing poverty in Uganda.  
 FDI and Official Development Aid, which does what and to what extent?  
 The Political Economy of land and FDI in Uganda. 
  Examining causes and the nature of corruption on TNCs in Uganda. 
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APPENDICES 
A. Lists of public enterprises not yet privatized – Uganda 
1. Diary Corporation Ltd 
2. Kinyara sugar works Ltd  
3. Uganda seeds Ltd  
4. Housing Finance Company of Uganda  
5. National Social Security Fund 
6. Post Bank Uganda Ltd 
7. Uganda Development Bank  
8. National Insurance Corporation (Privatization quite advanced) 
9. Kilembe Mines Ltd  
10. Uganda Development Corporation (Lake Katwe Project)  
11. Uganda Posts Ltd 
12. New Vision Printing and Publishing Corporation  
13. National Housing and Construction Corporation  
14. Mandela National Stadium  
15. Uganda Railway Corporation  
16. National Water and Sewage Corporation  
__________ 
United Nations (2005, p. 96): An Investment Guide to the EAC: Opportunities and Conditions. New York 
and Geneva, July 2005  
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B. List of completed privatization Transactions in Uganda 
as per 1st December 2002 
No
. 
Enterprise Buyer  Date  Participa
nt  
Method  Amoun
t (Ushs) 
1 Acholi Inn MS Laoo Ltd  May 1995 Ugandan Sale of assets  235 m 
2 African Ceramic Co.  Muhindo Enterprise Ltd  May 1996 Ugandan Sale of assets  0.270 
bn 
3 African Textile Mills P/S Patel  May 1996 Uganda  Share sale 1.4 bn 
4 Agip (U) Ltd  Agip Petrol International  May 1996 Foreign  Share sale  1.675 
bn 
5. Agricultural Enterprises 
Ltd 
Common Development Corp Oct 1993 Foreign  Join Venture  US$12.
7m* 
6 Apollo Hotel 
Corporation Ltd 
MIDROC Ethiopia p/c March 
2001 
Foreign  Sale of share US$18
m* 
7 Bank of Baroda  Bank of Baroda (India) June 1999 Foreign  Shares/pre-
emptive rights 
2.5 bn 
8 Barclays Bank of 
Uganda Ltd 
Barclays P/c Oct 1998 Foreign  Shares/pre-
emptive rights 
5 bn 
9 BAT BAT Investments Ltd Sep 1999 Foreign  Shares/pre-
emptive rights 
US$ 7m 
10 BAT Various  
 
June 2000 Ugandan Initial public 
offering -USE 
Shs 
1,000 
per 
share  
11 Blenders (U) Ltd Unilever Overseas Holding BVC Aug 1994 Foreign  Share sale US$531
,586 
12 Comrade Cycles (U) Ltd Uganda Motors Ltd Jan 1997 Ugandan  Share sale n/a 
13 East African Distilleries  International distillers and vintners Nov 1992 Foreign  Share sale  US$ 
600,000  
14 Government Central 
Purchasing Corp. 
Management and employees July 2000 Ugandan Management 
buyout  
1.09bn 
15 Hilltop Hotel Three Links Ltd May 1995 Ugandan  Sale of assets  35 m 
16  Hotel Margherita Reco Industries Ltd Aug 1994 Ugandan  Sale of assets US$ 
400,000 
17 ITV sales ROKO construction  Dec 1996 Foreign  Sale of assets 0.32bn 
18 Kakira Sugar Works East African Holdings Ltd July 2000 Foreign  Shares/pre-
emptive rights 
3.5bn 
19 Kampala Auto 
Centre(Gomba Motors 
Ltd) 
Management  Nov 1995 Ugandan  Auction  0.110bn 
20 Kibimba Rice Co. Ltd Tilda holdings  Sep 1996 Foreign  Share sale  1.607bn 
21 Lake Victoria bottling 
Co. Ltd  
Crown Bottlers (U) Ltd  Feb 1993 Ugandan  Share sale  6.46 bn 
22 Lake Victoria Hotel  Windsor Ltd  Aug 1995 Foreign  Share sale  3.06 bn 
23 Lango Dev. Co Sunset International Ltd May 1998 Ugandan  Share sale  0.1bn  
24 Lira Hotel  Showa trade Com. Ltd Jan 1995 Ugandan  Sale of assets 250m 
25 Masindi Hotel Ottoman Engineering  Feb 2000 Ugandan  Sale of assets US$500
,000 
26 Motorcraft and sale Ltd Andami Works Ltd Sep 1996 Ugandan  Share sale  0.200bn 
27  Mt Elgon Hotel  Busigu Cooperative Union  May 1995  Ugandan  Sale of assets 650m 
28 Mt. Moroto Hotel  Kodet International  Nov 1995  Ugandan  Sale of assets  40m 
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29 Mweya Safari Lodge  Madhani Group Aug 1995  Ugandan  concession 1.821bn 
30 NEC Pharmaceuticals 
Ltd  
Haupt Groupe Dec 1999 Foreign  Joint venture US$1.5
m 
31 Printpak (U) Ltd New Printpak (U) Ltd May 1996 Uganda  Management 
buyout 
0.9bn 
32 Republic motors  Rafiki trading com. Dec 1995 Ugandan  Auction  0.395bn 
33 Rock Hotel  Swisa Industries Ltd Nov 1994 Ugandan  Sale of assets 300m 
34 SAIMMCO Still Rolling Mills Ltd Sep 1999 Ugandan  Share sale 202m 
35 Second National 
Operator 
MTN March 
1998 
Foreign  concession US$5m 
36 Shell (U) Ltd  Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd Dec 1992 Foreign  Debt/equity 
swap  
12.79bn 
37 Soroti Hotel  Speedbird Aviation services Ltd Jan 1995 Ugandan  Sale of assets 150m 
38 Stanbic Bank (U) Ltd SBIC Africa Holdings Ltd Dec 1996 Foreign  Share sale  6.75bn 
+150m 
39 Steel Corporation of 
Africa Ltd (SCEA) 
Muljibhai Madhvani and Co. Ltd Jul 2000 Foreign  Shares/preemp
tive rights 
0.32bn 
40 Total (U) Ltd  Total Outre Mer March 
1996 
Foreign  Share sale 5.7bn 
41 Transocen 1998 (U) Ltd  Coin Ltd Jul 2001 Ugandan  Share sale 361m 
42 TUMPECO GM Company Ltd Aug 1994 Ugandan  Share sale US$700
,000+U
shs 
429m 
43 Uganda American 
Insurance Company  
American Life Insurance 
Company 
Nov 1992 Foreign  Repossession  n/a 
44 Uganda Cement 
Industry- Hima  
Rawals Group of Industries  Dec 1994 Foreign  Sale of assets US$20.
5m 
45 Uganda Cement 
Industry – Tororo  
Corrugated sheets Ltd Oct 1995 Foreign  Sale of assets 5.75bn 
46  Uganda Clays Ltd Various  Oct 1999 Ugandan  Initial Public 
Offering -USE 
Ushs 
4,000/ 
share  
47 Uganda Fisheries Ltd Nordic-African Fisheries Co. Ltd May 1995 Foreign  Share sale  US$1.1
m 
49 Uganda Garment 
Industries Ltd 
Phoenix Logistics (U) Ltd Aug 2000 Ugandan  Sale of assets US$0.5
m 
50 Uganda Grain Milling 
Co. 
Calebs International  Dec 1996 Ugandan  Share sale  5.3bn 
51 Uganda Hardwares Ltd Management  Oct 1995 Ugandan  Management 
buyout 
0.298bn 
52 Uganda Hire Purchse 
Co. 
Tadeo Kisseka  Nov 1999 Ugandan  Auction  0.00024
bn 
52 Uganda Industrial 
Machinery Ltd  
F.B Lukoma May 1997 Ugandan  Share sale 7m 
53 Uganda Leather and 
Training 
Industry(ULTI)  
IPS (U) Ltd Jul 1995  Ugandan  Sale of assets  1.71bn 
54 Uganda Meat Packers 
Ltd (Kampala Plant) 
Uganda meat Industries Ltd Aug 1995 Ugandan  Sale of assets 0.7bn 
55 Uganda Meat Packers –
Soroti  
Teso Agricultural Industrial Co. 
Ltd 
Nov 1997 Ugandan  Sale of assets 0.3bn 
56 Uganda motors Ltd  Management  Nov 1995 Uganda  Management 0.803bn 
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buyout  
57 Uganda Pharmaceuticals 
Ltd 
Vivi Holdings  Jul 1996 Foreign  Share sale  1.501bn 
58 Uganda Securiko Ltd Securiko (U) Ltd Aug 1993 Foreign  repossession n/a 
59 Uganda Tea Corporation Mehta Group May 1994 Ugandan  Repossession  n/a 
60 Uganda Telecom  Detecom Jul 2000 Foreign  Share sale  US$33.
5-* 
61 White Horse Inn  Kabale Dev.Co.Ltd Aug 1994 Ugandan  Sale of assets 600m 
62 White Rhino Hotel Dolma Associates Ltd May 1995 Ugandan  Sale of assets  200m 
63 EUGCL Eskom Enterprises  Nov 2002 Foreign  Concession   
64 Rwenzori Highland Tea 
Company Ltd 
Finlays Group  May 2002 Foreign  Share 
sale/preemptiv
e rights  
1.45bn 
65 Kiryara Ranch   Ziwwa Ranchers May 2002 Loca concession 0.800bn 
Source: UNCTAD Data Base –Uganda 
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C. FDI flows, to Uganda by type of investment 1990-2005 
(millions of dollars) 
Year  
 
 
 
Inward Investment  
Equity Re-invested 
earnings  
Inter-company 
loans 
Total  
1990 -- -- -- -5.9 
1991 1.0 -- -- 1.0 
1992 3.0 -- -- 3.0 
1993 49.6 5.0 0.01 54.6 
1994 78.2 10.0 -- 88.2 
1995 89.5 35.0 -- 124.5 
1996 30.0 10.0 -- 40.0 
1997 110.8 8.6 22.1 141.5 
1998 68.0 15.8 48.8 132.6 
1999 71.9 16.7 51.6 140.2 
2000 105.1 16.6 59.2 180.8 
2001 86.5 42.1 22.9 151.5 
2002 99.6 42.1 42.9 184.6 
2003 102.1 51.9 48.2 202.2 
2004 126.5 60.2 35.4 222.1 
2005 155.9 70.7 31.8 258.5 
 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database country profile – Uganda p.4 November 2006  
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D. SWOC Model Application in Uganda’s Economy  
Table 2: Strengths,  Weaknesses and Opportunities and Challenges in Uganda’s economy  
Strengths  Weaknesses  
 Strong and stable government 
commitment to private sector led 
growth  
 Average growth rate of 6 % over the 
past five  
 Trainable low cost labour  
 Good climate agricultural production 
and tourism  
 Location in EAC with 93 million 
consumers, COMESA (385 million) 
and SADC (215 million) and 
preferential access to EU (EBA) and 
USA markets (AGOA) 
 Relatively large and low-cost pool of 
workers, some with high engineering 
skilled and enterprising  
 Uganda is gifted by nature for 
agricultural production and tourism   
 Low inflationary rate 
 Strong donor support (HIPC) 
 Improved telecommunication 
services  
 Inadequate physical infrastructure 
 Shortage of technical and 
managerial skilled 
 Persistent though declining 
corruption  
 High cost of doing business  
 regulatory weaknesses in utility 
sector 
 low purchasing power in domestic 
market 
 land ownership systems limit on the 
availability of large scale land 
 Landlocked country 
 unreliable power supply and 
communication 
 poor road network and high 
transport costs 
 uneven regional distribution of FDI 
enterprises in the economy  
Opportunities  Challenges  
 Commercial agriculture and agro-
processing  
 Tourism and mining and oil 
exploration  
 Telecommunication, education and 
health services  
 Infrastructure development  
 Further Privatization  
 
 Regional and internal conflict 
(north) 
 HIV/AIDS impact labor resources 
and productivity 
 Potential completion from regional 
countries 
Source: Based on the information gathered from UNCTAD (2000a, p.16) Uganda 
Investment Policy Review, New York and Geneva; United Nations (2004, p.9); and 
United Nations (2005 p.31). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
